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中国创业板上市公司大股东与高管减持行为实证研究

发布时间:2018-04-30 18:34

  本文选题:创业板 + 大股东与高管 ; 参考:《辽宁大学》2013年博士论文


【摘要】:创业板大股东与高管限售股解禁以来,遭受轮番减持,“三高”发行是其重要原因;但创业板公司治理结构不完善、业绩不稳定、部分公司高成长性名不副实等也是减持的重要原因。创业板市场大股东与高管等内部人减持的动机与影响因素、减持过程中是否利用内部人的信息优势选择更佳的交易时机进行减持,,以及大规模减持所造成的市场效应等问题一直是理论与投资实践界关注的焦点。为此,本文对上述减持表现、动机、时机与市场效应四个方面的问题进行了系统、深入的研究。 在创业板市场上减持的各类高管与法人股东中,由于其在公司治理中所处的位置、持股份额和减持力度等诸多方面存在的差异,减持的市场效应也不尽相同。创业板上市公司高管作为重要的内部人,高管由于其持股比例、职务与相关人员的减持不同,其减持过程、对市场的冲击也不尽相同;而对于创业板市场上的法人类大股东(如风险投资、券商直投类的私募股权基金和产业资本),其持股份额虽不及实际控制人,但由于其减持退出的意愿较强,减持力度较大,因而对市场也有重要的冲击。针对不同类型的高管和大股东,本文第三章从多角度剖析了高管相关减持的状况。 大股东与高管减持具有多重动机。文献研究表明影响大股东与高管减持存在五大理论假说,即:控制权、宏观经济、市场趋势、估价估值与财务绩效。根据理论假说,本文第四章提出了创业板上市公司大股东与高管减持动机实证分析的研究假设,并在此基础上构建了一个计量经济分析模型,模型以减持股份占自身持股比例作为被解释变量,用公司股权结构、宏观经济、企业的估值水平、企业的财务业绩、市场行情、董事会治理等一系列变量对其进行拟合,模型估计的结果较好的验证了所提出的研究假设。为了确保本文构建的计量经济模型的稳定性,论文分别对两个解释变量进行了更换替代检验,结果证明模型具有较好的稳定性。 内部人信息优势与创业板市场信息披露及减持之间存在重要关系。文献研究表明,大股东与高管等内部人具有内幕信息和价值判断两方面的信息优势。创业板上市规则对信息披露与减持等有较为明确的规定,为了更清楚的了解限售股解禁后减持交易发生的时间,论文对限售股份解禁日期与减持日期进行了比较,发现高管与大股东具有不同的减持特征。通过总结创业板上市公司信息披露问题及内部人违规行为发现,存在高管层或其配偶在敏感期买卖股票、高管参与新股发现等一系列问题。为深入研究创业板上市公司大股东与高管是否存在信息操纵,进而选择减持时机的问题,论文构建了一个基于logistic的计量分析模型,该模型主要用于检验创业板市场的大股东与高管是否存在着在减持前发布利好消息或在减持交易后披露利空消息的问题。实证结果显示,他们减持前后的异常收益满足倒V型,内部人减持获得了较高的异常收益,具有精准的减持时机把握能力。最后,为了深入研究创业板市场大股东与高管是否存在利用盈余管理策略进行减持时机选择问题,论文构建了一组基于Jones模型的计量分析模型,模型估计结果显示,上市前一年创业板上市公司的可操控性应计利润较高,存在显著的正向盈余管理行为,在限售股解禁减持较多年份的前一年,盈余管理程度大幅上升,之后的年份盈余管理程度明显下降。由此可见,正向的盈余管理也是大股东减持能够获得较高超常收益的原因。 创业板市场大股东与高管的解禁与减持形成了广泛而深远的市场影响。但需要注意的是限售股的解禁与减持虽然是一个整体,但却是两个不同的过程。限售股只有解禁才可减持,但解禁并不一定马上减持。论文第六章综合考虑限售股解禁和减持的市场效应,并分别运用事件研究法进行分析。一方面,在限售股解禁的市场效应研究过程中,论文系统梳理了限售股解禁相关规定,并分析了限售股解禁的总体市场反应;为深入研究创业板上市公司原始股东限售股解禁的市场效应,本部分运用事件研究法计算了原始股东解禁前后平均异常收益率和平均累积异常收益率的变化情况,发现解禁事件对上述指标有明显的市场冲击效应。另一方面,也对限售股减持市场效应进行了六个层面的深入分析,具体包括:总体减持、不同股东减持、不同规模减持、不同业绩公司的减持、不同估值水平公司的减持与不同成长能力公司的减持。研究发现上述不同侧面,减持的市场效应均有所不同。
[Abstract]:Since the large shareholders of the GEM and the high - tube restricted - sale unit have been released , the issuance of " three high " is the important reason .
However , the corporate governance structure of the GEM is not perfect , the performance is unstable , some of the company ' s high - growing reputation and so on are also the important reasons for the reduction . Whether to use the information advantage of the inner person to choose the better trading opportunity and the market effect caused by the large - scale reduction are always the focus of the theory and investment practice . In this paper , the thesis systematically and deeply researches the above - mentioned problems of the reduction performance , motivation , opportunity and market effect .

Among all kinds of executive and legal person shareholders reduced in the GEM market , the market effect is different because of the differences in the position , the share of the shares held by the company in the corporate governance , the holding force and so on .
For the big shareholders of the law in the GEM market ( such as venture capital , private - equity funds and industrial capital of securities firm ' s direct investment ) , the shareholding fraction is less than that of the actual controller , but because of its strong willingness to withdraw , it has an important impact on the market . In view of the different types of executive and large shareholders , the third chapter analyzes the state of the high - tube related reduction from the multi - angle .

On the basis of the theory hypothesis , the paper puts forward the research hypothesis of the empirical analysis of the large shareholder and the executive incentive mechanism of the GEM listed company , and then constructs a measurement economic analysis model . The model is based on the theory hypothesis . The paper proposes the research hypothesis of the model based on the theory hypothesis . In order to ensure the stability of the measurement economic model , the paper also replaces the two explanatory variables and verifies the result .

The paper constructs a quantitative analysis model based on Jones model .

There are broad and far - reaching market effects on the restraining and reducing of the big shareholders and executives in the GEM market . However , it is important to note that the restraining and reducing of the limited - selling stocks is a whole , but it is two different processes . However , it is not necessary to reduce them immediately . The sixth chapter of the paper comprehensively considers the market effect of the limited - sale unit and applies the event research method . On the one hand , in the research of the market effect of the restricted - sale unit , the paper systematizes the relevant regulations of the restriction of the restricted - sale unit , and analyzes the general market reaction of the restriction of the restricted - sale unit ;
In order to study the market effect of the stock market effect of the original shareholders of the GEM listed company , this part uses the event research method to calculate the average abnormal rate of return and the average cumulative abnormal return rate before and after the original shareholder , and finds out that there is a clear market impact effect on the above - mentioned indexes .

【学位授予单位】:辽宁大学
【学位级别】:博士
【学位授予年份】:2013
【分类号】:F224;F275;F832.51

【引证文献】

相关期刊论文 前2条

1 周焯华;樊家秀;;创业板公司大股东减持内幕交易案例研究[J];财会月刊;2014年18期

2 徐昭;;上市公司内部人减持行为的内在机制综述[J];经济理论与经济管理;2014年03期

相关硕士学位论文 前2条

1 张云云;股东大量减持与创业板牛市并存现象研究[D];厦门大学;2014年

2 赵冠飞;会计信息透明度对创业板高管减持信息优势的影响研究[D];安徽大学;2014年



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