股权激励对上市公司过度投资的影响研究

发布时间：2018-05-04 11:49

本文选题：股权激励 + 过度投资　；参考：《南京财经大学》2013年硕士论文

【摘要】：经济高速发展也带来了过度投资现象的出现，企业作为投资的主体，其投资效率一直是公司治理的核心。投资行为直接影响公司经营发展的方向和未来现金流增长的速度乃至企业价值。股权激励作为一种制约过度投资的方法，于2005年底得到了我国法律上的认可，实施股权激励的公司也从最初的43家到2011年末的114家。但是同时必须也注意到股权激励才刚刚在我国实施，股权激励制度与公司的股权结构和企业制度还处在磨合阶段，因此我国上市公司是否适合股权激励的制度或者如何建立我国自己的股权激励都是国内学者对股权激励研究的核心内容。本文针对股权激励对上市公司的过度投资的影响研究，在股权激励理论和过度投资驱动理论的基础上，结合我国上市公司股权结构与股权激励的现状，引入股东控制权与股权激励的冲突并给与理论分析提出假设。实证检验部分，，对于过度投资的识别，本文采用了Richardson（2006）预期投资模型选取了2006-2011的上市公司作为初始研究样本进行研究，采用面板数据进行分析统计，方程的残差表示实际投资额与预期投资额的差值，残差为正则为过度投资，从而筛选出过度投资的数据。在检验股权激励对过度投资影响分析中，首先对股权激励进行内生性检验。在确定股权激励不存在内生性后，股权激励与过度投资直接的回归方程显示，股权激励对过度投资不存在显著影响。引入本文的创新点，股东控制权与股权激励的冲突概念后，股权激励对过度投资存在了显著的抑制作用。然后本文选取了股东控股模式、股权性质、股权制衡度和公司成长性四个指标看其如何影响股东控制权与股权激励的冲突，从而影响股权激励对过度投资的效果。本文的主要几个结论：①股权激励对过度投资存在显著的抑制作用；②股东控制权与股权激励存在冲突；③绝对控股下，即股东控制权与股权激励并不存在冲突，相对控股模式下，股东控制权与股权激励存在很大的冲突，抑制了股权激励的效果；④非国家终极控股公司的股东控制权与股权激励存在着冲突；⑤股权制衡度抑制了冲突（虽然是非显著的）；⑥公司成长速度越高，股东控制权与股权激励的冲突越高。
[Abstract]:The rapid development of economy also brings the phenomenon of excessive investment. As the main body of investment, the investment efficiency of enterprises is always the core of corporate governance. Investment behavior directly affects the direction of business development, the growth rate of cash flow and even the enterprise value. As a method of restricting excessive investment, equity incentive has been approved by law in our country at the end of 2005. The companies that implement equity incentive also have 114 companies from the beginning of 43 to the end of 2011. But at the same time, we must also notice that equity incentive has just been implemented in our country, and the equity incentive system is still in the running-in stage with the equity structure of the company and the enterprise system. Therefore, whether the listed companies in China are suitable for equity incentive system or how to establish their own equity incentive is the core content of domestic scholars' research on equity incentive. Based on the theory of equity incentive and the theory of overinvestment, this paper studies the influence of equity incentive on the overinvestment of listed companies, and combines the present situation of equity structure and equity incentive of listed companies in our country. The conflict between shareholder control and equity incentive is introduced and theoretical analysis is given. In the empirical test part, for the identification of overinvestment, this paper adopts Richardson's expected investment model to select the listed companies in 2006-2011 as the initial research sample, and uses panel data to analyze and statistics. The residuals of the equation represent the difference between the actual investment and the expected investment, and the residuals are regular as overinvestment, and the data of overinvestment are screened out. In the analysis of the impact of equity incentive on excessive investment, the endogenous test of equity incentive is carried out. After determining that there is no endogenous equity incentive, the regression equation between equity incentive and overinvestment shows that there is no significant effect of equity incentive on overinvestment. After the introduction of the concept of conflict between shareholder control and equity incentive, equity incentive has a significant inhibitory effect on overinvestment. Then this paper selects four indicators of shareholder controlling mode, equity nature, equity balance degree and company growth to see how they affect the conflict between shareholder control and equity incentive, thus affecting the effect of equity incentive on overinvestment. The main conclusions of this paper are as follows: (1) there is a significant inhibition of overinvestment by the equity incentive of 1: 2 there is a conflict between the shareholder's control right and the equity incentive, that is, there is no conflict between the shareholder's right of control and the equity incentive under absolute control. Under the relative holding mode, there is a great conflict between the shareholder control right and the equity incentive, which inhibits the effect of the equity incentive. (4) there is a conflict between the shareholder control right and the equity incentive of the non-state ultimate holding company. (5) the degree of equity balance restrains the conflict (although the higher the growth rate of the unremarkable company, the higher the conflict between shareholder control and equity incentive.
【学位授予单位】：南京财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F275;F832.51

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