“嚣张的特权”之理论阐述

发布时间：2018-05-08 06:08

本文选题：“嚣张的特权” + 国际货币　；参考：《经济研究》2011年09期

【摘要】：这篇文章利用一个一般均衡模型研究"嚣张的特权"是如何运作的,是否可持续,以及去掉这个特权的后果。文章的主要结果包括:(1)发行储备货币的中心国家享受这种"嚣张的特权",他们能够利用外围国家的外汇储备来为他们的经常账户赤字融资。这种"嚣张的特权"以储备货币的高估为基础,而这种高估的一个可能的原因是中心国家的较高的货币增长率。(2)这种"嚣张的特权"在长期是不可能持续的。(3)如果"嚣张的特权"被剥夺,储备货币将贬值,外围国家的贸易条件将恶化,中心国家的贸易部门和外围国家的非贸易部门将扩张。中心国家选择发行货币还债时,其货币的贬值和外围国家贸易环境的恶化将更加显著,但是两国部门结构变化的幅度将减弱。
[Abstract]:This paper uses a general equilibrium model to study how "arrogant privilege" works, whether it is sustainable, and the consequences of removing it. The main results include: 1) the central countries that issue reserve currencies enjoy this "arrogant privilege" of using the foreign exchange reserves of peripheral countries to finance their current account deficits. This "arrogant privilege" is based on the overvaluation of the reserve currency. One possible reason for this overestimation is the higher rate of monetary growth in the central countries.) this "arrogant privilege" is unlikely to continue in the long run) if the "arrogant privilege" is denied, the reserve currency will depreciate. The terms of trade of the peripheral countries will deteriorate and the trade sectors of the central countries and the non-trade sectors of the periphery countries will expand. When the central countries choose to issue currency to pay off their debts, the depreciation of their currencies and the deterioration of the trading environment in the peripheral countries will be more significant, but the changes in the structure of the sectors of the two countries will weaken.
【作者单位】：武汉大学高级研究中心和经济与管理学院;中央财经大学中国经济与管理研究院;澳大利亚蒙纳士大学经济系;
【分类号】：F821

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