我国上市商业银行高管薪酬激励的实证研究

发布时间：2018-06-10 09:40

本文选题：上市商业银行 + 高管薪酬　；参考：《青岛理工大学》2013年硕士论文

【摘要】：商业银行对国家金融安全与经济发展而言意义非凡，在现代企业所有权与经营权分离的时代背景下，高管薪酬激励的有效性直接影响高管行为，进而影响银行经营绩效，因此，银行高管薪酬机制的设计长期以来备受关注。怎样对商业银行高层实施有效的薪酬激励向来是研究的热点，美国次贷危机的爆发再次将银行业飙升的高管薪酬推向舆论的风口浪尖，银行高管天价高薪频引公众热议。我国四大国有商业银行的股份制改革已于2010年圆满收官，伴随着国有控股银行的纷纷上市，各商业银行也逐步加快了薪酬改革的步伐。如何完善银行治理结构，建立一套科学合理的薪酬激励机制，真正实现激励效果，这是银行业进一步改革的重点，更是银行业公司治理亟待解决的问题。本文对中、美、德三国商业银行薪酬激励机制现状进行了对比分析，以2001-2012年间16家国内上市商业银行作为研究样本，对银行高管薪酬、银行业绩与公司治理要素进行了实证研究，探究银行业高管薪酬的影响因素，求证高管激励与约束机制的有效性。通过实证检验，我们发现目前国内上市商业银行高管薪酬与绩效整体存在正相关的关系，银行规模也对高管薪酬存在正向影响，相反的，银行股权集中度越高，高管获得高薪的可能性越低，，而银行风险与安全指标与高管薪酬的敏感度则比较低。将银行按照国有性质分组后的实证结果显示，各影响因素在国有控股银行组中的显著性低于非国有控股银行组。基于理论研究与实证检验，本文总结出我国商业银行在薪酬激励设计方面的特点及其不尽合理之处。我们认为商业银行要真正实现对高管的薪酬激励与约束效应，首先需完善银行内部与外部治理机制，其次应优化薪酬结构、构建综合绩效指标体系，再次，银行业应重视制度改革与法制建设对合理高效的薪酬机制运行的保障。此外，国有控股银行可以通过优化股权结构、改善薪酬组合、精简管理层等方式逐步完成更合理的改革。
[Abstract]:Commercial banks are of great significance to national financial security and economic development. Under the background of the separation of ownership and management right of modern enterprises, the effectiveness of executive compensation incentive directly affects the executive behavior, and then affects the bank operating performance. The design of bank executive compensation mechanism has been concerned for a long time. How to implement effective compensation incentive to the senior level of commercial banks has always been a hot topic. The outbreak of the subprime mortgage crisis in the United States once again pushed the banking industry soaring executive pay to the forefront of public opinion. The joint-stock system reform of the four major state-owned commercial banks in our country has been successfully completed in 2010. Along with the listing of state-owned holding banks one after another, the commercial banks have gradually accelerated the pace of salary reform. How to perfect the bank governance structure, establish a set of scientific and reasonable salary incentive mechanism, and realize the real incentive effect, this is the focus of the further reform of the banking industry, but also the banking corporate governance problem to be solved urgently. This paper makes a comparative analysis of the current situation of compensation incentive mechanism of commercial banks in Germany, taking 16 domestic listed commercial banks as the research samples from 2001 to 2012, and makes an empirical study on executive compensation, bank performance and corporate governance elements. To explore the impact of banking executives pay factors, to verify the effectiveness of executive incentive and restraint mechanism. Through empirical test, we find that there is a positive correlation between executive compensation and performance in domestic listed commercial banks, and the scale of banks also has a positive impact on executive compensation. On the contrary, the higher the concentration of bank equity is, Executives are less likely to receive higher salaries, while bank risk and security measures are less sensitive to executive pay. The empirical results of grouping the banks according to the state-owned nature show that the significance of the influencing factors in the group of state-owned holding banks is lower than that in the group of non-state-owned holding banks. Based on theoretical research and empirical test, this paper summarizes the characteristics and unreasonable features of compensation incentive design in Chinese commercial banks. We think that in order to realize the compensation incentive and restraint effect of commercial banks, first of all, we should perfect the internal and external governance mechanism of banks, secondly, we should optimize the compensation structure, build a comprehensive performance index system, again, The banking industry should pay attention to the guarantee of reasonable and efficient salary system operation by system reform and legal system construction. In addition, the state-owned holding banks can gradually accomplish more reasonable reform by optimizing the ownership structure, improving the salary mix and streamlining the management.
【学位授予单位】：青岛理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F272.92;F832.33

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