高管薪酬契约与商业银行综合绩效——基于我国上市银行的实证分析

发布时间：2018-06-28 23:06

本文选题：上市银行 + 高管薪酬　；参考：《中央财经大学学报》2011年08期

【摘要】：本文选取我国14家上市银行2005-2009年间的面板数据,考察我国上市银行高管薪酬激励契约的有效性。运用固定效应模型估计结果显示,我国上市银行已经建立起基于业绩的高管薪酬制度,上市银行的薪酬体制越来越向市场化激励靠近,但是高管薪酬绩效敏感性高于一般上市公司,主要采取了"高报酬-业绩敏感性"激励机制。对于国有控股银行而言,政府对高管任命的控制权模糊了董事会与高管人员的委托—代理关系,形成了一个特殊的委托-代理关系链,实证研究表明,中央或地方政府控制的上市银行存在高管薪酬管制问题,高管货币化薪酬平均水平相对较低,形成了"准市场化"的高管激励体系。
[Abstract]:This paper selects the panel data of 14 listed banks from 2005 to 2009 to investigate the effectiveness of executive compensation incentive contracts in Chinese listed banks. The results of fixed effect model show that the executive compensation system based on performance has been established in China, and the compensation system of listed banks is more and more close to the market incentive. However, the performance sensitivity of executive compensation is higher than that of general listed companies, which mainly adopts the incentive mechanism of "high pay-performance sensitivity". For state-owned holding banks, the government's control over executive appointments obscures the principal-agent relationship between board of directors and executives, and forms a special chain of principal-agent relationship. There exists the problem of executive compensation regulation in listed banks controlled by central or local governments. The average level of executive monetization compensation is relatively low, which forms a "quasi-market-oriented" executive incentive system.
【作者单位】：中央财经大学经济学院;中国工商银行山东省分行;
【基金】：中国博士后科学基金项目“银行高管薪酬激励机制与综合绩效:基于上市银行的实证研究”(批准号20100470575)的资助
【分类号】：F832.33;F224

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