国有控股上市公司的控制权、金字塔式结构和侵占行为——来自中国股权分置改革的证据

发布时间：2018-08-21 10:29

【摘要】：文献认为,当上市公司的控制权和现金流出现分离时,会发生控股股东对上市公司的侵占,而这一分离会出现在二元股权或金字塔式的公司结构中。在中国,直到2005年实行股权分置改革之前,双类股和金字塔式的公司结构同时存在于上市公司。股权分置改革仅消除了二元股权结构,但金字塔式结构依然存在。通过对这一外生变化的研究,本文估计了控股股东利用金字塔式结构对上市公司进行侵占的规模。结果显示,控股权越大,现金流权越小,侵占的规模越大。同时,这种侵占在国有控股公司中更明显,在私人公司中并未出现。究其原因,虽然国有企业的现金流权高于私人企业,但国有公司的控股权比例也高于私人公司。股权分置改革削弱了控股股东的侵占能力,但分离仍然存在,而且依旧产生对小股东的侵占。结果显示,侵占的平均规模为总资产的7%～8%。如果实行"一股一票"原则,资产扩张会减少13%。
[Abstract]:The literature holds that when the control rights and cash flow of listed companies are separated, the occupation of the listed companies by controlling shareholders will occur, and this separation will occur in the dual equity or pyramid corporate structure. In China, dual-share and pyramid-based corporate structures existed at the same time in China until the implementation of the split share structure in 2005. The reform of split share structure only eliminates the dual ownership structure, but the pyramid structure still exists. Based on the study of this exogenous change, this paper estimates the scale of controlling shareholders' encroachment on listed companies by pyramid structure. The results show that the larger the controlling right, the smaller the cash flow right and the larger the scale of encroachment. At the same time, this kind of encroachment is more obvious in the state-controlled company, not in the private company. The reason is that although the cash flow rights of state-owned enterprises are higher than that of private companies, the controlling share of state-owned companies is also higher than that of private companies. The split share structure reform weakens the controlling shareholder's encroachment ability, but the separation still exists, and still produces the occupation to the minority shareholder. The results show that the average size of the encroachment is 7 / 8 of the total assets. If the "one-share, one vote" principle, asset expansion will be reduced by 13.
【作者单位】：日本贸易振兴机构亚洲经济研究所;
【分类号】：F276.1;F832.51

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