管理层持股、机构投资者与上市公司财务重述研究

发布时间：2018-09-07 10:18

【摘要】：20多年之前,中国证券市场诞生,如今的它逐渐形成了比较规范的运作体系和平稳有序的市场环境。投资者渐渐意识到有价值的上市公司远比有价值的股票更具有长期收益性和投资价值,而投资者对上市公司长远投资收益的追逐致使其对潜在的价值型上市公司的运营治理极其关注,正是因为存在实践经验的如此需求,公司治理问题一直深受学术界关注。经过大量的理论探讨和实证检验之后,学者们提出一系列公司治理机制,其中就包括内部管理层股权激励机制和外部机构投资者持股两个方面。通过对近年来中国证券市场数据的搜集整理,发现上市公司的管理层持股情况与市场刚刚形成的初期相比更为普遍；同时从整个证券市场的层面上来看投资机构的持股比例已经超过个人投资者,可见越来越多的上市公司开始采用管理层股权激励和外部机构投资者持股这两种机制。然而,这两种机制究竟能否发挥积极的公司治理作用,目前仍存在争议。上市公司财务重述行为的出现意味着公司对外发布的财务或者非财务信息存在错误或者披露不充分,是公司治理存在缺陷的表象。本文在现有研究成果的基础上,拟从财务重述的视角考察管理层持股和外部机构投资者的公司治理效果如何。本文选取截至2012年末针对2009—2011年度对外披露的年报发布“补丁公告”——补充公告、更正公告以及补充更正公告的A股上市公司及其配对样本公司作为研究对象,对管理层股权激励机制与机构投资者持股机制之间是否存在相互制约的关系以及这两种机制能否在公司治理过程中发挥积极的作用进行实证检验。本文分为六部分。第一部分,绪论。本部分主要阐述研究背景与意义、研究思路与框架、研究内容与方法以及积极探索,为后文的深入研究作铺垫。第二部分,文献综述。本部分根据国内外现有研究成果回顾有关文献：管理层持股与机构投资者持股之间的关系,管理层持股、机构投资者持股对财务重述的作用机制,管理层持股与财务重述之间的关系以及机构投资者持股与财务重述之间的关系。第三部分,理论分析与研究假设。首先对本文研究内容的理论基础进行阐述,其次界定本文研究所涉及到的几个重要概念,最后针对管理层持股与机构投资者持股之间的关系、管理层持股与财务重述的关系、机构投资者持股与财务重述的关系以及机构投资者持股会对管理层持股与财务重述之间的关系产生何种影响进行理论分析,提出研究假设。第四部分,研究设计。针对研究内容选取数据,经过删选后得到研究样本,根据第三部分的理论分析和研究假设设计模型,并对模型中涉及到的各个变量进行定义,为第五部分进行实证检验做好准备。第五部分,实证结果与分析。利用统计软件对样本数据进行一系列实证检验,获取实证结果并进行初步分析,以检验管理层持股与机构投资者持股之间关系以及这二者与财务重述之间的关系。第六部分,研究结论、政策建议与进一步研究方向。这一部分主要是对实证研究结果进行总结,并有针对性的提出政策建议,同时指出本文的研究不足以及今后继续研究的方向。本文主要得出以下研究结论：管理层持股机制与机构投资者持股机制相互制约,管理层持股在公司治理过程中发挥堑壕效应,机构投资者持股在公司治理过程中发挥积极的外部监管职能,并且能够在一定程度上抑制管理层持股的堑壕效应。针对以上研究结论,本文提出政策建议：上市公司应该实施符合我国具体国情的股权激励政策,在对管理层进行股权激励的同时要加强对其监督约束的力度；同时我国监管机构可以出台有关政策,鼓励投资机构参与上市公司的经营治理过程。
[Abstract]:More than 20 years ago, China's securities market was born, and now it has gradually formed a more standardized operating system and a stable and orderly market environment. It pays great attention to the operation and governance of potential value-oriented listed companies. It is precisely because of the need for practical experience that corporate governance has been deeply concerned by academia. By collecting and sorting out the data of China's securities market in recent years, it is found that the managerial shareholding of listed companies is more common than that of the initial stage of the market formation. At the same time, from the perspective of the whole securities market, the shareholding ratio of investment institutions has exceeded that of individual investors. More and more listed companies begin to adopt the two mechanisms of management equity incentive and external institutional investors'shareholding. However, whether these two mechanisms can play an active role in corporate governance remains controversial. Wrong or incomplete disclosure is the appearance of defects in corporate governance.
Based on the existing research results, this paper intends to examine the corporate governance effect of managerial shareholdings and external institutional investors from the perspective of financial restatement. The listed companies and their matched sample companies are taken as the research objects to test whether there is a mutual restrictive relationship between managerial equity incentive mechanism and institutional investors'shareholding mechanism, and whether these two mechanisms can play an active role in corporate governance process.
This article is divided into six parts.
This part mainly elaborates the research background and the significance, the research mentality and the frame, the research content and the method as well as the positive exploration, paves the way for the later in-depth study.
The second part is literature review. This part reviews the relevant literature based on the existing research results at home and abroad: the relationship between managerial shareholding and institutional investors'shareholding, managerial shareholding, the mechanism of institutional investors' Shareholding on financial restatement, the relationship between managerial shareholding and financial restatement, and institutional investors'shareholding and financial restatement. The relationship between them.
The third part is theoretical analysis and hypothesis. Firstly, the theoretical basis of the research content is elaborated. Secondly, several important concepts are defined. Finally, the relationship between managerial shareholding and institutional investors'shareholding, the relationship between managerial shareholding and financial restatement, institutional investors' shareholding and financial restatement are discussed. This paper analyzes the relationship between managerial shareholding and financial restatement and puts forward research hypotheses.
The fourth part, research design. Select the data for the research content, get the research sample after deletion, design the model according to the theoretical analysis and research hypothesis of the third part, and define the variables involved in the model, prepare for the empirical test of the fifth part.
In the fifth part, the empirical results and analysis are given. A series of empirical tests are carried out on the sample data with statistical software to obtain the empirical results and make a preliminary analysis.
The sixth part is the conclusion of the study, policy recommendations and further research directions. This part mainly summarizes the empirical research results, and puts forward policy recommendations. At the same time, it points out the shortcomings of this study and the direction of future research.
This paper draws the following conclusions: the managerial shareholding mechanism and institutional investors'shareholding mechanism restrict each other, managerial shareholding plays a trench effect in the process of corporate governance, institutional investors' shareholding plays an active external regulatory role in the process of corporate governance, and can restrain the management shareholding to a certain extent. Trench effect.
In view of the above conclusions, this paper puts forward policy suggestions: listed companies should implement equity incentive policies in line with China's specific national conditions, strengthen the supervision and restraint of management while carrying out equity incentive; at the same time, China's regulatory agencies can introduce relevant policies to encourage investment institutions to participate in the operation of listed companies. Governance process.
【学位授予单位】：东北财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F276.6;F832.51;F272.91

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