POS刷卡系统中各参与方的动态博弈
发布时间：2018-11-01 15:44
【摘要】：随着全球经济网络的迅速发展,商家与消费者均对电子商务表现出高涨的热情,电子商务的发展促进经济和金融业的发展,但同时也对现代银行业、信用产业提出了更大的挑战。2004年,深圳爆发了“银商之争”导致电子支付系统接近瘫痪；2013年2月,中国人民银行又正式通知各商业银行和金融机构下调了23%-24%刷卡支付手续费,这让商业银行的创收又增加了难度,但此项政策的出台给商家减少了不少负担。 在整个刷卡支付系统中,商业银行和商家之间存在利益间的矛盾,这种矛盾会直接影响外部的交易市场的正常进行,本文就是试图寻找缓解双方矛盾的方法。就研究方法而言,本文主要把市场类型和动态博弈相结合,并引入消费者和商家对银行卡的需求函数,求解POS系统中交易费的精炼纳什均衡解,并分析在均衡条件下各参与方的收益和最佳策略。本文研究得出的结论是： (一)在不同市场类型行下,商家在POS刷卡系统中的地位是不同的,那么商家的策略对银行间交易费的影响就会不同,总的来说,商家的策略对银行间交易费的影响是很有限的。 (二)消费者和商家对卡的需求才是影响交易费的关键因素,因为消费者和商家对卡的需求量变化会直接反映到银行的市场占有率上,这样银行就会做出相应的对策以争取得到更大的市场份额,尤其是当有多个银行卡组织时,这种影响尤为明显。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of the global economic network, both businesses and consumers have shown high enthusiasm for e-commerce. The development of e-commerce promotes the development of economy and financial industry, but also for the modern banking industry. The credit industry has put forward a bigger challenge. In 2004, Shenzhen broke out of "the competition between banks and merchants", which caused the electronic payment system to be nearly paralyzed; In February 2013, the people's Bank of China formally informed commercial banks and financial institutions that they had lowered their fees by 23 to 24 percent, which made it more difficult for commercial banks to generate income, but the introduction of the policy reduced the burden on businesses. In the whole credit card payment system, there is a contradiction between commercial banks and merchants, which will directly affect the normal conduct of the external trading market. This paper is trying to find ways to alleviate the conflicts between the two sides. As far as the research method is concerned, this paper mainly combines the market type with the dynamic game, and introduces the demand function of consumers and merchants to solve the refined Nash equilibrium solution of transaction cost in POS system. At the same time, the paper analyzes the benefit and the best strategy of each participant under the equilibrium condition. The conclusions of this study are as follows: (1) under the different market types, the position of the merchant in the POS credit card system is different, then the impact of the merchant's strategy on the interbank transaction costs will be different. The impact of merchants' strategies on interbank transaction costs is limited. (2) the demand for cards by consumers and businesses is the key factor affecting transaction fees, because the changes in demand for cards by consumers and businesses will directly reflect the market share of banks. In this way, the banks will make corresponding countermeasures to gain a larger market share, especially when there are more than one bank card organization.
【学位授予单位】：云南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：O225;F832.3
本文编号：2304375
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of the global economic network, both businesses and consumers have shown high enthusiasm for e-commerce. The development of e-commerce promotes the development of economy and financial industry, but also for the modern banking industry. The credit industry has put forward a bigger challenge. In 2004, Shenzhen broke out of "the competition between banks and merchants", which caused the electronic payment system to be nearly paralyzed; In February 2013, the people's Bank of China formally informed commercial banks and financial institutions that they had lowered their fees by 23 to 24 percent, which made it more difficult for commercial banks to generate income, but the introduction of the policy reduced the burden on businesses. In the whole credit card payment system, there is a contradiction between commercial banks and merchants, which will directly affect the normal conduct of the external trading market. This paper is trying to find ways to alleviate the conflicts between the two sides. As far as the research method is concerned, this paper mainly combines the market type with the dynamic game, and introduces the demand function of consumers and merchants to solve the refined Nash equilibrium solution of transaction cost in POS system. At the same time, the paper analyzes the benefit and the best strategy of each participant under the equilibrium condition. The conclusions of this study are as follows: (1) under the different market types, the position of the merchant in the POS credit card system is different, then the impact of the merchant's strategy on the interbank transaction costs will be different. The impact of merchants' strategies on interbank transaction costs is limited. (2) the demand for cards by consumers and businesses is the key factor affecting transaction fees, because the changes in demand for cards by consumers and businesses will directly reflect the market share of banks. In this way, the banks will make corresponding countermeasures to gain a larger market share, especially when there are more than one bank card organization.
【学位授予单位】：云南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：O225;F832.3
【参考文献】
相关期刊论文 前6条
1 魏鹏;;对银行卡POS回佣收费状况的分析研究[J];金融论坛;2007年08期
2 纪汉霖;;双边市场定价方式的模型研究[J];产业经济研究;2006年04期
3 吴巧瑜;董尚朝;;民间商会组织的社会治理功能透视——深圳“银商之争”的经验观察[J];华南师范大学学报(社会科学版);2009年04期
4 程贵孙;陈宏民;孙武军;;双边市场视角下的平台企业行为研究[J];经济理论与经济管理;2006年09期
5 朱振中,吕廷杰;双边市场经济学研究的进展[J];经济问题探索;2005年07期
6 骆品亮,何之渊;银商之争的经济学分析:从沃尔玛诉讼案到中国的罢刷事件[J];上海管理科学;2005年02期
，本文编号：2304375
本文链接：https://www.wllwen.com/guanlilunwen/bankxd/2304375.html
