利益相关者行为对我国创业板市场IPO定价的影响

发布时间：2018-11-22 08:22

【摘要】：2009年10月23日,在经过了十年的准备之后,我国创业板股票市场在深圳证券交易所正式开板。创业板市场与主板相对应,相补充,它为短期内没有办法达到主板上市条件的那些中小企业和新兴企业提供融资渠道和发展机会,同时,它也为风险资本提供了一个正常的退出机制。创业板IPO即是指这些企业在创业板市场首次公开发行股票,进行融资的行为。但是,由于创业板上市企业存在着科技含量高,规模较小,未来增长潜力大的特征,因此,很难找到相匹配的上市企业作为IPO定价的参考。并且,最终确定的IPO价格是发行人、承销商以及投资者等利益相关者的力量相互作用、相互权衡的结果。因此,传统的估值方法在创业板IPO市场的运用存在着局限性,而一级市场的定价是否合理直接影响到二级市场以及整体市场的有效性。因此,确定利益相关者行为的影响对研究创业板IPO定价具有非常重要的意义。本文在系统的阐述传统IPO定价理论的基础上,分析其适用性,并结合我国创业板市场的基本特征以及利益相关者的行为,将创业板IPO定价的影响因素分为内在价值因素、外部市场因素以及利益相关者行为因素。通过因子分析法和逐步回归法,对各个因素的量化指标与创业板IPO溢价倍数进行多元回归分析,从而针对创业板市场IPO定价构建多因素模型,重点对上市过程中利益相关者对IPO定价的影响程度进行分析。实证分析表明,私募基金发行前持股比例对IPO溢价倍数具有显著的负相关性,而询价对象家数对创业板IPO溢价倍数具有显著的正向作用,承销商声誉与IPO溢价倍数并不存在显著的相关关系。这一结论说明,在我国创业板市场IPO定价中支持私募基金的“声誉效应假说”,即私募创投机构为了获得资本市场上的良好声誉,会倾向于压低发行价格,从而使所投资的企业比较顺利的上市,从而有利于其后续融资。同时,本文也支持机构投资者的“从众效应”假说,但并不支持高声誉的承销商具有“信息生产”和“认证”的能力的假说。最后,本文针对IPO过程中存在的信息不对称问题、询价机构诚信问题以及私募创投机构行为问题提出了政策建议。
[Abstract]:On October 23, 2009, after ten years of preparation, China's gem stock market officially opened in Shenzhen Stock Exchange. The gem market corresponds to the main Board and complements it by providing financing channels and development opportunities for small and medium-sized enterprises and emerging enterprises that do not have access to the listing conditions of the main Board in the short term, and at the same time, It also provides a normal exit mechanism for venture capital. Growth Enterprise Market (IPO) refers to the initial public offering of stocks and financing of these enterprises in the gem market. However, due to the characteristics of high scientific and technological content, small scale and large growth potential in the future, it is difficult to find matching listed enterprises as the reference for IPO pricing. Furthermore, the final IPO price is the result of the interaction of stakeholders such as issuers, underwriters and investors. Therefore, the application of the traditional valuation method in the gem IPO market is limited, and whether the pricing of the primary market is reasonable or not has a direct impact on the effectiveness of the secondary market and the overall market. Therefore, to determine the impact of stakeholder behavior on the gem IPO pricing has a very important significance. On the basis of expounding the traditional IPO pricing theory systematically, this paper analyzes its applicability, and combines with the basic characteristics of gem market and the behavior of stakeholders, divides the influencing factors of gem IPO pricing into intrinsic value factors. External market factors and stakeholder behavioral factors. By means of factor analysis and stepwise regression, the multivariate regression analysis is carried out between the quantitative index of each factor and the IPO premium multiple of gem, so as to construct a multifactor model for IPO pricing in gem market. The impact of stakeholders on IPO pricing in the process of listing is analyzed. The empirical analysis shows that the proportion of private equity holdings has a significant negative correlation with the IPO premium multiple before issuance, while the number of people asking for price has a significant positive effect on the IPO premium multiple of gem. There is no significant correlation between underwriter reputation and IPO premium multiple. This conclusion indicates that in order to gain good reputation in the capital market, private equity firms tend to lower the issuing price in order to support the "reputation effect hypothesis" of private equity funds in IPO pricing in China's gem market. In order to make the investment of enterprises relatively smooth listing, thus conducive to its subsequent financing. At the same time, this paper also supports the "herd effect" hypothesis of institutional investors, but does not support the hypothesis that highly reputable underwriters have the ability of "information production" and "certification". Finally, this paper puts forward some policy suggestions on the problem of information asymmetry in the process of IPO, the credit problem of inquiry institution and the behavior problem of private venture capital institution.
【学位授予单位】：华东师范大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F832.51

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