金融契约、控制权配置与管理者投资决策

发布时间：2018-11-28 08:12

【摘要】：以金融契约和控制权配置理论为基础,构建了"金融契约—控制权配置—管理者投资决策"的理论分析框架,揭示了不同金融契约结构下企业控制权配置的属性特征及其对管理者投资决策的影响,并以2002～2005年中国上市公司数据进行了实证检验。结果表明,企业负债规模与过度投资之间存在非线性U型关系;同时,流通股比例增加则有利于抑制管理层过度投资,但第一大股东持股比例增加不仅不能抑制过度投资,反而会恶化过度投资。进一步研究发现,其他条件相同的情形下,地方国企的过度投资程度最高,央属国企的过度投资水平居中,而民营企业的过度投资水平最低。
[Abstract]:Based on the theory of financial contract and control right allocation, this paper constructs the theoretical analysis framework of "financial contract-control right allocation-managers' investment decision". This paper reveals the attributes of corporate control allocation under different financial contract structures and its influence on managers' investment decisions, and makes an empirical test based on the data of Chinese listed companies from 2002 to 2005. The results show that there is a nonlinear U-type relationship between debt scale and overinvestment. At the same time, the increase in the proportion of outstanding shares is conducive to curb management overinvestment, but the increase in the proportion of the largest shareholder not only can not inhibit overinvestment, but will worsen overinvestment. Further study shows that under the same conditions, the local state-owned enterprises have the highest degree of overinvestment, the central state-owned enterprises have the middle level of over-investment, and the private enterprises have the lowest level of over-investment.
【作者单位】：重庆大学经济与工商管理学院;
【基金】：教育部人文社科青年基金(09YJC630243)“可转债融资对内部公司治理和企业价值的影响及机理研究”,教育部高等学校博士点新教师基金(20100191120041)“控制权配置、相机治理机制与企业价值:基于控制权动态转移视角” 中央高校基本科研业务费重点项目(CDJSK 11 009)“我国企业高管腐败的制度诱因、产生机理及治理对策研究”
【分类号】：F224;F832.51;F272

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