基于股份减持中的大股东隧道行为实证研究
发布时间：2019-03-15 11:04
【摘要】：以2007～2009年被大股东减持的沪深A股上市公司作为样本,运用OLS与Logistic回归方法,实证分析了大股东通过操纵重大信息披露在股份减持过程中的隧道行为。得出了在减持前30个交易日被大股东减持的上市公司有显著的正累计超常收益,但减持后30个交易日则出现显著的负累计超常收益;被大股东减持的上市公司在减持前披露"利好"消息、减持后披露"利空"消息的概率高;民营控股上市公司大股东操纵上市公司信息披露的概率较高;公司估值(托宾值)越高,大股东信息操纵行为的概率也越大;被减持公司的净资产收益率(ROE)与总资产收益率(ROA)对大股东信息操纵行为的概率不存在显著影响等结论。
[Abstract]:Taking the Shanghai-Shenzhen A-share listed companies which were reduced by the major shareholders from 2007 to 2009 as a sample, this paper empirically analyzes the tunneling behavior of the major shareholders in the process of stock reduction by manipulating the major information disclosure by using the OLS and Logistic regression methods. It is concluded that the listed companies that have been reduced by the major shareholders in the 30 trading days before the reduction have significant positive cumulative extraordinary returns, but there are significant negative cumulative extraordinary returns in the 30 trading days after the reduction. The listed companies that have been reduced by large shareholders have high probability of disclosing "good news" before and after the reduction, while the large shareholders of private holding listed companies have a higher probability of manipulating the information disclosure of listed companies, and there is a high probability of disclosing "positive news" before and after the reduction of the holdings of listed companies. The higher the corporate valuation (Tobin value), the greater the probability of the information manipulation behavior of the large shareholders, and the conclusion that the reduced return on assets (ROE) and the total return on assets (ROA) have no significant influence on the probability of the information manipulation behavior of the major shareholders.
【作者单位】： 天津大学管理与经济学部;
【分类号】：F832.51;F224
[Abstract]:Taking the Shanghai-Shenzhen A-share listed companies which were reduced by the major shareholders from 2007 to 2009 as a sample, this paper empirically analyzes the tunneling behavior of the major shareholders in the process of stock reduction by manipulating the major information disclosure by using the OLS and Logistic regression methods. It is concluded that the listed companies that have been reduced by the major shareholders in the 30 trading days before the reduction have significant positive cumulative extraordinary returns, but there are significant negative cumulative extraordinary returns in the 30 trading days after the reduction. The listed companies that have been reduced by large shareholders have high probability of disclosing "good news" before and after the reduction, while the large shareholders of private holding listed companies have a higher probability of manipulating the information disclosure of listed companies, and there is a high probability of disclosing "positive news" before and after the reduction of the holdings of listed companies. The higher the corporate valuation (Tobin value), the greater the probability of the information manipulation behavior of the large shareholders, and the conclusion that the reduced return on assets (ROE) and the total return on assets (ROA) have no significant influence on the probability of the information manipulation behavior of the major shareholders.
【作者单位】： 天津大学管理与经济学部;
【分类号】：F832.51;F224
【参考文献】
相关期刊论文 前3条
1 吴育辉;吴世农;;股票减持过程中的大股东掏空行为研究[J];中国工业经济;2010年05期
2 贾明;张U，
本文编号：2440569
本文链接：https://www.wllwen.com/guanlilunwen/bankxd/2440569.html
