中国国有企业投资效率研究

发布时间：2018-01-04 11:02

本文关键词：中国国有企业投资效率研究　出处：《北京外国语大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：在全面深化改革的大背景下,在国民经济中居于关键地位的国有企业正在中国经济转型过程中发挥着举足轻重作用。众所周知,国有企业体量庞大,根基深厚,在资源配置方面把握这国民经济的命脉。正是因为这样的原因,研究国有企业对于把握经济发展全局有着不容忽视的意义,值得深入探索和发掘。随着改革的步步深入,国有企业的投资效率正逐步成为各方关注的焦点。作为拉动经济增长的三驾马车之一,投资对于国民经济的增长及其结构调整发挥着不容忽视的作用。当前,我国国有企业呈现出的过度投资、投资不足等问题,投资效率仍有较大的提高空间。另一方面,学术界对于国企投资效率的研究起步较晚,当前的研究并不透彻。因此,针对我国全面深化改革的特殊背景,研究国企投资效率及其影响因素具有十分重要的意义。当今中国正处于改革攻坚期,一系列全面深化改革的政策正在有序推进。论文拟以制造业为例,通过相关数据进行实证分析,结合实践经验,就国有企业所有权制度、公司治理、政治关联等因素与国企投资效率的关系进行研究,以期为新时期的国有企业改革提供一定的参考。投资效率即为投资收益与投资成本之比。近年来,国内外学者对企业的投资效率进行了大量研究,但基于不同的目的和视角,对其定义却没有一个公认的概念。一般说来,投资效率有效率投资和非效率投资两个表现方式,非效率投资又分为投资不足和投资过度。在样本选择方面,利用万德数据库,选取在上海证券交易所和深圳证券交易所上市的制造业国有企业的相关数据进行分析,利用2000年至2015年在沪深两市制造类国有企业作为样本。本文借鉴Bertrand和Mullainathan提出的双重差分法构建模型,并通过实证回归的残差来衡量过度投资和投资不足程度,以此分析国有股权控制和高管政治关联对国有企业的投资效率的影响。在模型中,还引入了企业投资规模、销售增长率、经营现金流、总资产收益率、资产负债率、大股东控制度、公司规模和总资产周转率等解释变量。通过实证分析,笔者得出了以下结论。第一,国有股东控制权与高管政治关联二者中的单一因素对企业投资效率具有负面影响。第二,国有控制权和高管政治关联的复合作用对企业投资效率有积极影响。第三,在国企中,政府可以通过留存对企业的控制权同时任命具有较强政治关联的高管人员,借此提升企业的整体的投资效率。这一发现对新时期中国国有企业的改革实践具有一定的参考意义。各级政府可以通过牢固把握国有股权以及对高管的认识刁培来实现对企业的控制,在此基础上提升企业投资效率。
[Abstract]:Under the background of deepening the reform in an all-round way, the state-owned enterprises, which occupy a key position in the national economy, are playing an important role in the process of China's economic transformation. As we all know, the state-owned enterprises have a large volume and deep foundation. It is precisely because of this reason that the study of state-owned enterprises is of great significance to grasp the overall situation of economic development. With the deepening of the reform, the investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises is gradually becoming the focus of attention. Investment plays an important role in the growth of the national economy and its structural adjustment. At present, the problems of excessive investment and insufficient investment in state-owned enterprises in China appear. On the other hand, the academic research on the investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises started relatively late, the current research is not thorough. Therefore, in view of the special background of China's comprehensive deepening reform. It is of great significance to study the investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises and its influencing factors. Nowadays, China is in the period of reform and a series of policies to deepen the reform are advancing in an orderly manner. This paper intends to take the manufacturing industry as an example. Through the empirical analysis of relevant data, combined with practical experience, this paper studies the relationship between state-owned enterprise ownership system, corporate governance, political association and the investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises. In order to provide a certain reference for the reform of state-owned enterprises in the new period, investment efficiency is the ratio of investment income and investment cost. In recent years, domestic and foreign scholars have carried out a large number of research on the investment efficiency of enterprises. However, based on different purposes and perspectives, there is no accepted concept to define it. Generally speaking, efficient investment and inefficient investment are two ways of expression. Inefficient investment is divided into underinvestment and overinvestment. In the aspect of sample selection, we use Wande database. The relevant data of state-owned manufacturing enterprises listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange are analyzed. From 2000 to 2015, manufacturing state-owned enterprises in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets are used as samples. This paper uses the dual difference method proposed by Bertrand and Mullainathan to construct the model. And through empirical regression residual to measure the degree of overinvestment and insufficient investment, so as to analyze the impact of state-owned equity control and senior executives political connections on the investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises. In the model. The paper also introduces some explanatory variables, such as investment scale, sales growth rate, operating cash flow, total return on assets, asset-liability ratio, controlling degree of large shareholders, company size and total asset turnover. The author draws the following conclusions. Firstly, the single factor of state-owned shareholder control and executive political connection has a negative impact on enterprise investment efficiency. Second. The combination of state-owned control and the political connection of senior executives has a positive impact on the efficiency of enterprise investment. Third, in the state-owned enterprises. The government can appoint executives with strong political connections by retaining control of the business. In order to improve the overall investment efficiency of enterprises, this discovery has certain reference significance for the reform practice of Chinese state-owned enterprises in the new period. Governments at all levels can firmly grasp the state-owned equity rights and the understanding of senior executives. To realize the control of the enterprise. On this basis, improve the efficiency of enterprise investment.
【学位授予单位】：北京外国语大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F425;F406.7

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