不对称信息下应用服务外包合同与应用服务供应链风险分担合同

发布时间：2018-04-03 15:09

本文选题：应用服务供应链　切入点：外包合同　出处：《重庆大学》2011年博士论文

【摘要】：近年来,以应用服务提供商(Application Service Provider, ASP)服务模式为代表的应用服务外包逐渐成为中小企业解决信息化建设中资金短缺、人才匮乏等问题的有效手段之一。然而,现实交易环境中的信息不对称给由应用基础设施提供商(Application Infrastucture Provider,AIP)、ASP以及客户企业所组成的应用服务供应链带来很多风险,各节点企业的过度风险规避行为导致应用服务供应链运作绩效较低,以致严重阻碍了ASP服务模式的发展。对此,本文研究不对称信息下如何通过应用服务外包合同及应用服务供应链风险分担合同的设计以激励ASP显示真实的服务能力信息、成本信息以及付出所期望的努力水平,并在竞争与市场需求不确定环境下实现ASP与上游供应商之间关于市场风险的合理分担。首先,针对服务能力信息不对称下客户企业选择ASP的逆向选择问题,建立了应用服务外包委托代理模型,通过模型求解得到了应用服务外包最优招标合同菜单,并对该合同的相关性质进行了分析。不对称信息下客户企业主要根据服务能力、经济成本选择ASP,而与服务报价无关;客户企业向ASP支付的服务报酬主要由服务成本及信息租金两部分组成;ASP中标的服务能力较完全信息下中标的服务能力低。其次,在考虑外界网络条件影响客户企业服务收益的情况下研究ASP的道德风险问题,设计了对称信息及不对称信息条件下的应用服务外包激励合同,并分析了最优外包合同的性质。对称信息条件下,客户企业将承担外界网络条件不确定所带来的全部风险;不对称信息条件下,最优合同不能以无差异合同形式存在,且最优合同在网络条件较好时能实现帕累托最优,而在网络条件较差时发生扭曲,存在效率损失。随后,在前面研究的基础上,针对客户企业如何平衡激励ASP在硬件及软件建设的多任务投入问题设计了应用服务外包正式合同、关系合同,并分析了贴现率及成本替代强度对合同激励效果的影响。贴现率较低时,客户企业应选择正式合同对ASP进行激励;随着贴现率的增加,关系合同的激励效果增加;关系合同中,不同任务之间的激励效果具有互补性,且随成本替代性逐渐增强。再次,针对ASP成本效率参数及努力水平信息不对称下的应用服务外包合同设计问题进行研究。在ASP所拥有的成本效率参数及努力水平均不可观测下研究客户企业如何通过外包合同设计以激励ASP显示其所拥有的成本信息及付出最优的努力水平。收益共享系数是成本效率参数、风险规避度、产出方差的减函数;客户企业向ASP支付的期望服务报酬除了补偿保留效用与服务生产成本还将额外支付风险成本、信息租金;风险成本随风险规避度、产出方差递增,随成本效率参数递减;信息租金随风险规避度、产出方差、成本效率参数递减。最后,针对应用服务供应链上游节点企业ISV(Independent Software Vendor,独立软件开发商)与ASP面临市场竞争与需求不确定下的市场风险分担问题,建立了随机需求下的Stackelberg博弈模型,研究了ASP承担风险及ISV承担风险两种风险分担合同,并运用算例对外生变量进行了参数敏感性分析。当由ISV承担风险时,ASP将向ISV定购其所分配服务需求的上限;ASP承担风险时,ISV将向ASP提供一个软件许可销售计划,并通过提高软件开发质量及维护升级服务水平来提高ASP订购软件许可的积极性;ASP作为盟主的风险分担合同较ISV作为盟主的风险分担合同对应用服务供应链的协调效果好。
[Abstract]:In recent years, the application service provider (Application Service, Provider, ASP) service model as the representative of the application service outsourcing has become the small and medium-sized enterprise informatization construction to solve the shortage of funds, one of the effective means of problems such as shortage of talent. However, the information asymmetry of real trading environment for the application infrastructure provider (Application Infrastucture, Provider, AIP) the application of service supply chain, ASP and enterprise customers which bring about the risks of excessive risk of each enterprise hedging behavior lead to the application of service supply chain operation efficiency is low, that seriously hindered the development of ASP service model. In this regard, this paper studies how to design contract under asymmetric information sharing through the application service outsourcing contract and application services. Supply chain risk to stimulate ASP display service ability of real information, cost information and pay the desired Work hard and realize the reasonable share of market risk between ASP and upstream suppliers under the uncertainty of competition and market demand.
First of all, according to the adverse selection problem of ASP customer service ability of enterprises under asymmetric information, establish the application service outsourcing agent model, through the model to obtain the optimal bidding application service outsourcing contract menu, and the related properties of the contract are analyzed. The customer enterprise under information asymmetry mainly according to the service ability, the economic costs of ASP, but has nothing to do with the service price; customer service remuneration paid to ASP mainly by the cost of service and information rent of two parts; the ASP service is under complete information the service ability is low.
Secondly, considering the problem of moral hazard effects of ASP external network condition return customer service business case, the design of symmetric information and asymmetric information under the conditions of the application service outsourcing incentive contract, and analyzes the properties of optimal contracts. Under symmetric information, enterprise customers will bear the external network condition does not identify all risks bring; under the conditions of asymmetric information, the optimal contract can not exist in difference form of the contract, and the optimal contract in good network condition can achieve Pareto optimal, and distorted under poor network conditions, there is efficiency loss. Then, on the basis of previous research, aiming at how to balance customer incentive in multi task ASP the hardware and software construction investment design application service outsourcing formal contract, relational contract, and analyzes the discount rate and the cost of alternative strength of the contract Effect of incentive effect. The discount rate is low, enterprise customers should choose a formal contract incentive for ASP; with the increase of the discount rate, increase the incentive effect of the relational contract; relational contract, incentive effect between different tasks are complementary to each other, and with the cost of replacement gradually increased.
Thirdly, research on the problem of application service outsourcing contract design ASP cost efficiency parameters and effort level under asymmetric information. The cost efficiency parameters and effort level have in ASP can not be observed by the customer enterprise outsourcing contract design to stimulate ASP display information and pay the cost of the optimal level of effort of its own. The revenue sharing coefficient is the cost efficiency parameters, risk aversion, reduction function of variance of output; enterprise customers to pay ASP expected service remuneration in addition to compensation of reservation utility and service production cost will also pay an additional risk cost, risk cost and risk information rent; aversion, the variance of output increasing, decreasing cost efficiency parameter; the information rent and risk aversion, the variance of output, decreasing cost efficiency parameters.
Finally, according to the application of service supply chain node enterprise ISV (Independent Software Vendor, independent software developers and ASP) facing the market competition and demand uncertainty under the market risk sharing problem, set up a Stackelberg game model under stochastic demand, the ASP risk and ISV risk two risk sharing contract, and use of operator cases of exogenous variable parameter sensitivity analysis was conducted by ISV. When the ASP will take the risks, to limit ISV order assigned service demand; ASP risk, ISV will provide a ASP software license sales plan, and by increasing the quality of software development and maintenance and upgrade service level to increase the enthusiasm of ASP the order of software license; ASP as the risk sharing contract with ISV as the risk sharing effect on supply chain coordination application service contract.

【学位授予单位】：重庆大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2011
【分类号】：C931;F224;F273.7

【参考文献】