交通BOO项目特许权竞标机制设计
发布时间：2018-09-12 19:16
【摘要】：设计了交通BOO(build,own and operate)项目的竞标机制来提高项目拍卖者对特许经营权的配置效率.运用激励机制设计思想建立了竞标机制模型,在保证竞标企业参与投标和真实显示自己的经营能力的条件下最大化期望社会福利,通过求解此模型得到了最优的竞标机制;鉴于最优机制在形式上的复杂性,给出了得分规则拍卖和供应契约拍卖两种最优拍卖方式.
[Abstract]:This paper designs the bidding mechanism of traffic BOO (build,own and operate) project) to improve the allocation efficiency of project auctioneers to franchise. The competitive bidding mechanism model is established by using the incentive mechanism design idea, which maximizes the expected social welfare under the condition of ensuring the bidding participation of the bidding enterprises and showing their management ability. The optimal bidding mechanism is obtained by solving this model. In view of the complexity of the optimal mechanism in form, two optimal auction methods are given: the auction of score rule and the auction of supply contract.
【作者单位】： 湖北经济学院统计与应用数学系;武汉大学经济与管理学院;武汉大学数学与统计学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(60574071,78771078,70471034)
【分类号】：C931
，
本文编号：2239977
[Abstract]:This paper designs the bidding mechanism of traffic BOO (build,own and operate) project) to improve the allocation efficiency of project auctioneers to franchise. The competitive bidding mechanism model is established by using the incentive mechanism design idea, which maximizes the expected social welfare under the condition of ensuring the bidding participation of the bidding enterprises and showing their management ability. The optimal bidding mechanism is obtained by solving this model. In view of the complexity of the optimal mechanism in form, two optimal auction methods are given: the auction of score rule and the auction of supply contract.
【作者单位】： 湖北经济学院统计与应用数学系;武汉大学经济与管理学院;武汉大学数学与统计学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(60574071,78771078,70471034)
【分类号】：C931
，
本文编号：2239977
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