给予政府补贴的家电行业供应链定价决策研究
发布时间:2018-01-03 07:12
本文关键词:给予政府补贴的家电行业供应链定价决策研究 出处:《现代商业》2015年27期 论文类型:期刊论文
更多相关文章: 供应链 博弈论 收人分享契约 供应链协调 政府补贴
【摘要】:由于消费人群对于电子产品外观,功能,质量等方面提出多元化需求,各种类型的新产品应运而生。随着更新换代速度的加快,家电产业就产生了诸多问题,比如耗电量过高、废掉家电处理不妥等。在这样的形势下,政府根据社会生活需要推出了以旧换新的活动。本文以博弈理论为基本的工具,对政府补贴下的供应链定价决策进行分析、探讨。论文首先分别构建了政府补贴下的供应链斯坦科尔伯格分散决策模型和集中决策模型。经过分析非合作定价时让零售商负责销售的产品定价问题,将结果与联合定价时的结果比较,发现当中存在双重边际加价效应。为避免供应链中存在双重边际加价以改善整个系统失调,文中建议通过制定销售收入分享契约来综合协调管理供应链各个环节。该收入分享契约有效地改善了供应链失调的状况,使制造商和零售商共同分享利益,从而达到供应链最优绩效。在最后对政府补贴额变动对于定价决策的影响进行分析,并利用数值算例验证了本文的研究结论。。
[Abstract]:As consumers put forward diversified demand for the appearance, function and quality of electronic products, various types of new products emerge as the times require. With the acceleration of the speed of upgrading, many problems have arisen in the household appliance industry. For example, excessive consumption of electricity, improper disposal of discarded household appliances and so on. In such a situation, according to the needs of social life, the government launched the old for new activities. This paper based on the game theory as a basic tool. This paper analyzes the pricing decision of supply chain under government subsidy. First of all, the paper constructs a decentralized decision model and a centralized decision model of the supply chain, which are supported by the government. After analyzing the non-cooperative pricing, retailers are responsible for the pricing of the products sold. By comparing the results with the results of joint pricing, it is found that there is a double marginal mark-up effect. In order to avoid the existence of double marginal price increase in the supply chain to improve the whole system imbalance. It is suggested that the sales revenue sharing contract should be used to coordinate and manage all aspects of the supply chain. The revenue sharing contract can effectively improve the imbalance of the supply chain and enable manufacturers and retailers to share the benefits together. Finally, the effect of the change of government subsidy on pricing decision is analyzed, and the numerical example is used to verify the conclusion of this paper.
【作者单位】: 山西师范大学;
【分类号】:F426.6;F274
【正文快照】: 本文以博弈理论为基本的工具,对政府补贴下的供应链定价决策进行分析、探讨。论文首先分别构建了政府补贴下的供应链斯坦科尔伯格分散决策模型和集中决策模型。经过分析非合作定价时让零售商负责销售的产品定价问题,将结果与联合定价时的结果比较,发现当中存在双重边际加价效
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