碳排放约束下考虑制造商竞争的供应链动态博弈

发布时间：2018-01-16 23:26

本文关键词：碳排放约束下考虑制造商竞争的供应链动态博弈　出处：《工业工程与管理》2014年01期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：在碳排放总量限制和排放交易政策约束下,分析了由两个制造商和一个占主导地位的零售商组成的两级供应链中联合减排问题。考虑产品需求受减排率和低碳推广影响且两产品间存在部分替代性,文中借助有同时选择的两阶段动态博弈模型,研究了制造商减排和零售商低碳推广相结合的联合减排模式,得到了联合减排模式下两制造商各自的最优减排率和零售商的最优低碳推广程度;并与制造商单独减排模式对比,发现当零售商销售两产品的边际利润比满足一定条件时,零售商有动机为制造商提供不同程度的低碳推广参与联合减排,并且在联合减排模式下制造商的减排率有所增加;最后通过数值分析,验证了结论的有效性,并对相关参数进行了灵敏度分析。
[Abstract]:Under the limits of total carbon emissions and emission trading policies. The problem of joint emission reduction in a two-level supply chain composed of two manufacturers and a dominant retailer is analyzed. Considering that product demand is affected by emission reduction rate and low-carbon promotion, there are some substitutions between the two products. In this paper, with the help of a two-stage dynamic game model with simultaneous selection, the combined emission reduction model between manufacturers and retailers is studied. The optimal emission reduction rate of the two manufacturers and the optimal low carbon promotion degree of the retailers are obtained under the joint emission reduction model. And compared with manufacturers alone, it is found that when the marginal profit ratio of two products meets certain conditions, retailers have incentives to provide manufacturers with different levels of low-carbon promotion to participate in joint emission reduction. And under the joint emission reduction mode, the emission reduction rate of manufacturers has increased; Finally, the validity of the conclusion is verified by numerical analysis, and the sensitivity analysis of related parameters is carried out.
【作者单位】：天津大学管理与经济学部;军事交通学院汽车工程系;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71072155)
【分类号】：F205;F713.3
【正文快照】： 1引言近年来,各国政府、企业和学者已经形成共识,温室效应是导致全球气候变暖的主要原因,而经济活动中的碳排放是导致温室效应的主要根源[1]。在此背景下,各国政府都在讨论减少温室气体排放的解决方案,欧盟2005年制定的“排放交易方案”(Emissions-Trading Scheme,ETS)是目前

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