互补品制造供应链的集团采购与需求信息共享

发布时间：2018-01-19 01:36

本文关键词： 集团采购信息共享需求预测收益共享契约互补品　出处：《管理科学学报》2017年08期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：研究了集团采购中信息共享的激励问题.考虑两个互补品制造商通过一个集团采购组织(group purchasing organization,GPO)集中采购某种部件,制造商分别观测到不完美需求预测信息,并可选择向GPO共享任意水平信息量.通过建立不完全信息下的动态博弈模型和求解博弈均衡,分析互补性、信息精度和信息共享水平等因素对于系统绩效的影响,揭示制造商的信息共享激励问题,进而设计基于收益共享契约的信息共享激励机制.研究发现,批发价格契约下,各制造商不愿共享任何信息,信息共享会加剧双重边际效应,削弱互补效应和预测效应,从而降低系统利润;收益共享契约下,各制造商愿意共享全部信息,且所有参与者实现帕累托改进,而进一步消除制造商间的信息不对称可使系统达到最优.
[Abstract]:In this paper, the incentive problem of information sharing in group procurement is studied. Two complementary manufacturers are considered as a group purchasing organization through a group procurement organization. GPOs centralize the purchase of components and manufacturers observe imperfect demand forecasts separately. And can choose to share any level of information with GPO. By establishing dynamic game model under incomplete information and solving game equilibrium, the complementarity is analyzed. The influence of information precision and information sharing level on system performance reveals the information sharing incentive problem of manufacturers and then designs the information sharing incentive mechanism based on revenue sharing contract. Under the wholesale price contract, the manufacturers are unwilling to share any information. The information sharing will aggravate the double marginal effect, weaken the complementary effect and forecast effect, and thus reduce the system profit. Under the revenue-sharing contract, the manufacturers are willing to share all information, and all the participants achieve Pareto improvement, and further eliminate the information asymmetry between manufacturers can make the system optimal.
【作者单位】：重庆大学经济与工商管理学院;深圳大学管理学院;重庆大学现代物流重庆市重点实验室;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71272086;71572020) 国家社会科学基金重大资助项目(15ZDB169) 国家科技支撑计划资助项目(2015BAF05B01) 中国博士后科学基金资助项目(2016M602529)
【分类号】：F274
【正文快照】： 0引言集团采购是由多个买家委托第三方集团采购组织GPO集中进行的采购活动.与独立采购(in-dividual purchasing)相比,集团采购更容易获得规模和范围上的经济性.近年来,多品种、小批量化生产已成趋势,伴随跨企业信息共享技术的发展,集团采购日益成为众多企业实现降本增效的重要

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