电子废弃物回收处理体系的激励契约研究

发布时间：2018-01-19 11:18

本文关键词： 电子废弃物逆向物流政府补贴斯塔克伯格博弈供应链协调　出处：《东华大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：随着科学技术的不断进步以及生产力的飞速发展,加上大众消费水平的提高以及产品生命周期的缩短,大量的电子废弃物也随着产生。导致资源浪费和环境污染的问题也日益严重。如果这些电子废弃物得不到有效的处理,不仪浪费了大量的资源也将给环境造成严重的污染。然而目前我国电子废弃物的回收处理大多数落在高污染、低资源再用的小作坊手中,正规的回收处理企业却得不到有效资源。虽然国家实施“以旧换新”政策促使一部分电子废弃物流入正规渠道,但后政策时代如何促进正规渠道回收同时规范非正规渠道的回收行为,成为诸多学者关注的热点。基于上述背景,本文首先深入研究了国内外电子废物回收处理相关文献,基于理论基础：逆向供应链理论、博弈论以及供应链协调理论,分析并指出不同回收模式的优势和劣势。其次,分析了我国电子废弃物回收处理产业的现状并指出问题：即大量废弃物被非正规流动商贩回收,并且很大程度上未得到妥善处置,而正规回收商及处理商在回收竞争中不具备价格优势。因此本文重点研究回收环节中双渠道模式下的回收商和处理商的二级逆向供应链系统,建立了回收量受正规和非正规回收商回收价格竞争影响的Stackelberg博弈模型,讨论了有无政府补贴情形下的几种决策情况,并比较分析了补贴机制对系统最优决策的影响,进一步考虑供应链内部处理商和回收商间加入二部定价激励契约模型和基于目标回收量的奖惩激励契约模型对供应链进行协调分析。研究结果表明,分散式系统存在的双重边际化问题；政府实行补贴政策可以提高逆向供应链的回收量,并且同等条件下,政府补贴第三方回收商比补贴处理商对整个回收系统的效果更加显著；回收商和处理商间制定二部定价契约可以消除边际效应,实现整体效益达到集中化决策水平；处理商和第三方回收商之间建立回收量阀值的奖惩契约无法协调整个逆向供应链,即系统总回收量和利润并未增加,但可以协调非正规回收商和正规回收商在回收竞争中的强弱关系,实现优化电子废弃物逆向供应链的目的。本文旨在找出政府补贴决策的合理实施对象,对流动商贩引导和监督以及对正规回收企业进行激励和扶持,运用激励契约对整体供应链进行协调。达到使电子废弃物回收产业向正确的方向发展的最终目标,研究成果可为我国政府对电子废弃物回收处理的管制提供决策建议和方法支持。
[Abstract]:With the continuous progress of science and technology and the rapid development of productivity, coupled with the improvement of the level of mass consumption and the shortening of product life cycle. A large amount of e-waste is also produced. The problems that lead to waste of resources and environmental pollution are becoming more and more serious. If these e-waste can not be effectively treated. The waste of a lot of resources will also cause serious pollution to the environment. However, at present, most of the recycling and disposal of e-waste in China is in the hands of small workshops with high pollution and low resource reuse. Formal recycling enterprises do not have access to effective resources, although the implementation of the "old for new" policy has prompted a portion of e-waste to flow into formal channels. However, in the post-policy era, how to promote the recovery of formal channels and regulate the recovery behavior of informal channels has become a hot topic for many scholars. Based on the above background, this paper first deeply studies the domestic and foreign electronic waste recovery and disposal related literature, based on the theoretical basis: reverse supply chain theory, game theory and supply chain coordination theory. The advantages and disadvantages of different recycling modes are analyzed and pointed out. Secondly, the current situation of electronic waste recovery and disposal industry in China is analyzed and the problems are pointed out: that is, a large number of wastes are recovered by informal mobile vendors. And to a large extent has not been properly disposed of. Formal recyclers and processors do not have a price advantage in the recovery competition, so this paper focuses on the two-stage reverse supply chain system of recyclers and processors in the two-channel mode of recycling. This paper establishes the Stackelberg game model of the recovery amount affected by the competition of the recovery price between the formal and the informal recyclers, and discusses several kinds of decision-making situations under the situation of anarchic subsidy. The effects of subsidy mechanism on the optimal decision of the system are compared and analyzed. Furthermore, the supply chain coordination is analyzed by adding two models of pricing incentive contract and reward and punishment incentive contract model based on target payback amount between the processors and recyclers in the supply chain. The results show that there is a double marginalization problem in decentralized systems. Government subsidy policy can improve the recovery of the reverse supply chain, and under the same conditions, the government subsidizes the third-party recyclers more effectively than the subsidy handlers to the whole recovery system. The establishment of two pricing contracts between recyclers and processors can eliminate the marginal effect and realize the overall benefit to the level of centralized decision-making. The reward and punishment contract between the processor and the third party recycler can not coordinate the whole reverse supply chain, that is, the total recovery and profit of the system has not increased. However, it can coordinate the relationship between informal recyclers and regular recyclers in the competition of recycling, so as to optimize the reverse supply chain of electronic wastes. The purpose of this paper is to find out the reasonable implementation object of the government subsidy decision, to guide and supervise the mobile vendors and to encourage and support the formal recycling enterprises. The use of incentive contracts to coordinate the overall supply chain to achieve the final goal of e-waste recycling industry to the correct direction of development. The research results can provide decision suggestion and method support for our government to control the recycling and disposal of electronic waste.
【学位授予单位】：东华大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：X705

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