基于公平偏好的供应链收益共享契约协调研究

发布时间：2018-01-22 14:37

本文关键词： 收益共享契约公平偏好供应链契约协调行为供应链管理　出处：《重庆交通大学》2015年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：随着科学技术的高速发展和经济的全球化,使得供应链之间的竞争逐渐替代了企业之间的竞争,供应链管理中的供应链协调也变的越来越重要。又因为供应链中的各成员之间存在信息不对称和自私性行为,所以在各成员之间需要建立协调机制非常重要。关于供应链契约的研究以往多数是基于决策者完全理性的研究:即决策者总以利益最大化作为行为准则。然而近年来,人类行为因素对供应链决策的影响引起了众学者的关注,因为考虑行为因素使得决策者不仅仅是追求最大的收益,有时他们还会考虑收益是否分配公平,这为传统的供应链契约提出了新的研究课题。论文第一部分研究供应商为领导者的一对一的供应链结构,研究以Nash均衡解作为公平偏好参考点,分别对只考虑零售商公平偏好,以及同时考虑零售商和供应商公平偏好这两种情况下,在以往文献基础上加入残值和缺货成本这两个参数,建立收益共享契约的协调模型。首先,研究只考虑零售商关注公平的时候,收益共享契约的协调性。此时供应链要想实现协调,只要批发价格和收益共享系数之间建立一定的等式关系,而与零售商的公平偏好程度没有任何关系。然后,同时考虑供应链中的两个决策者都具有公平偏好行为情形下,研究供应链的协调情况,以及供应链成员的最优决策。此情形下的收益共享契约只有在零售商的公平偏好大于供应商的公平偏好,并且零售商公平偏好不能太大,供应商公平偏好不能太小时,供应链才能实现协调。最后通过数值分析验证了前面的推论。论文第二部分,研究一对二的稍复杂的供应链结构,考虑两个零售商与供应商顺序展开博弈,在此基础上引入公平偏好理论。只考虑两个零售商具有公平偏好行为倾向时,建立收益共享契约的协调模型。通过数值仿真得到结论:零售商1考虑分布式公平偏好,零售商2考虑分布式公平偏好关切和同行诱导公平偏好,公平偏好系数都不会对两个零售商和供应链系统的最优订货量产生影响,供应链能够实现协调。本文将传统供应链契约与公平偏好行为紧密结合在一起,并且将供应链结构从一对一扩展到一对多二的情况,丰富和完善了传统供应链契约理论。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of science and technology and the globalization of economy, the competition between supply chains has gradually replaced the competition among enterprises. Supply chain coordination in supply chain management is becoming more and more important, and because of the information asymmetry and selfish behavior among the members of the supply chain. Therefore, it is very important to establish coordination mechanism among members. Most of the researches on supply chain contract are based on the complete rationality of decision makers:. That is, policy makers always take the maximization of interests as the code of conduct. However, in recent years. The influence of human behavior factors on supply chain decision-making has attracted the attention of many scholars, because consideration of behavioral factors makes decision makers not only pursue the maximum benefits, but also consider whether the benefits are distributed fairly. This brings forward a new research topic for the traditional supply chain contract. The first part of this paper studies the one-to-one supply chain structure with the supplier as the leader and takes the Nash equilibrium solution as the fair preference reference point. Considering only retailer's fair preference and retailer's and supplier's fair preference, two parameters, residual value and shortage cost, are added on the basis of previous literature. Firstly, the coordination model of revenue sharing contract is established. Firstly, the coordination of revenue sharing contract is considered only when retailers are concerned about fairness. At this time, the supply chain wants to achieve coordination. As long as the wholesale price and income sharing coefficient establish a certain equality relationship, and there is no relationship with the retailer's fair preference. Then. At the same time, considering the two decision makers in the supply chain have fair preference behavior, the coordination of the supply chain is studied. In this case, only the retailer's fair preference is greater than the supplier's fair preference, and the retailer's fair preference can't be too large. Supplier fair preference can not be too small supply chain coordination. Finally through numerical analysis to verify the above inference. The second part of this paper studies the one-to-two slightly complex supply chain structure. Considering the two retailers and suppliers in the order of game, on the basis of the introduction of fair preference theory, only consider the two retailers have the tendency of fair preference behavior. Through numerical simulation, we conclude that retailer 1 considers distributed fairness preference, retailer 2 considers distributed fair preference concern and peer induced fairness preference. The fair preference coefficient has no effect on the optimal order quantity of the two retailers and the supply chain system, and the supply chain can achieve coordination. In this paper, the traditional supply chain contract and fair preference behavior are closely combined. The supply chain structure is extended from one to one to one to many two, which enriches and perfects the traditional supply chain contract theory.
【学位授予单位】：重庆交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：F274

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