TPL参与的生鲜农产品供应链成本谎报行为分析

发布时间：2018-01-24 10:34

本文关键词： TPL服务商生鲜农产品序贯非合作博弈成本谎报　出处：《软科学》2017年09期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：假定市场需求依赖于零售价格和物流服务水平,研究了供应商主导、TPL和零售商跟随的生鲜农产品三级供应链的成本谎报问题。针对无谎报、TPL单边谎报、TPL和零售商双边谎报三种情形,分别建立了序贯非合作博弈模型,给出了谎报下的最优谎报策略并分析了成本谎报对系统成员决策和利润的影响。研究表明:谎报会造成物流服务水平、市场需求和供应商利润减少;单边谎报下零售价格、零售商利润低于无谎报和双边谎报情形,而TPL利润则大于后两种情形;单边谎报下系统利润大于双边谎报情形,而单边和双边谎报下系统利润并非一定低于无谎报的情形。
[Abstract]:Based on the assumption that market demand depends on retail price and logistics service level, this paper studies the problem of cost misstatement in the three-level supply chain of fresh agricultural products followed by suppliers and retailers. There are three kinds of cases: TPL unilateral false report and retailer bilateral false report, and the sequential non-cooperative game model is established respectively. The optimal lying strategy under false report is given, and the influence of cost misstatement on the decision and profit of system members is analyzed. The research shows that false report will cause logistics service level, market demand and supplier profit decrease; Under the condition of unilateral falsehood, retailer profit is lower than that of non-false and bilateral falsehood, while TPL profit is larger than the latter two. The system profit under unilateral false report is larger than that under bilateral false report, while the system profit under unilateral and bilateral false reporting is not always lower than that without false report.
【作者单位】：中国矿业大学管理学院;
【基金】：教育部人文社会科学基金项目(15YJC630018) 中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(2013W12)
【分类号】：F326.6
【正文快照】： 引言供应链中的成员均为独立的决策体,他们为了获取自身的竞争优势,往往在市场竞争中尽可能保留私有信息,这造成信息不对称的现象普遍存在,如制造商拥有生产能力、产品质量和生产成本等信息优势,零售商拥有销售成本、市场预测等信息优势,而第三方物流服务商(以下简称TPL)则拥

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