基于批发价格契约的供应链质量成本分担合同研究

发布时间：2018-01-27 06:30

本文关键词： 批发价格委托代理质量成本道德风险产品结构　出处：《青岛大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：供应链质量管理,就是以组成供应链的各成员伙伴内部质量管理为基础,从宏观的角度考虑实现供应链上成员伙伴之间质量职能和质量活动的协调、整合和优化。基于产品质量的合同设计是供应链质量管理的实施方法和途径,供应商和购买商之间签订的产品质量惩罚合同和产品质量担保合同就是其中一种。而且根据合同依据的项目不同又可分为基于供应链内部故障和基于供应链外部故障的供应链合同。其中,内部故障为购买商对供应商所提供的中间产品进行入厂检验时检测出不合格的产品,外部故障则是不合格的中间产品在入厂检验过程中未检测出,从而卖给消费者后出现产品质量问题。核心企业需要通过合同管理,来约束供应链上各成员的行动,减少机会主义,提高其合作积极性和质量管理的效率。本文在总结了国内外关于供应链质量管理的研究成果的基础上,研究了由一个风险中性的供应商和一个风险中性的购买商所组成的二级供应链中,在考虑产品质量失误的情况下的质量合同设计问题,主要研究内容如下： (1)不考虑二次加工情况下的供应链质量成本分担合同研究。建立了以批发价格为契约的二级供应链模型,运用委托代理方法,以信息对称条件下的供应链最优解为基础,分别求解了在三种信息不对称情况下的最优内、外部损失成本分摊系数,设计出最优的质量成本分担合同,并进行了算例分析。 (2)二次加工情况下产品结构独立的质量成本分担合同研究。考虑了购买商在进行简单二次加工情况下的最优质量合同设计,以信息对称条件下的供应链最优解为基础,求解了产品结构独立时存在单边道德风险情况下的最优内、外部损失成本分摊系数。 (3)二次加工情况下产品结构相关的质量成本分担合同研究。探讨了当购买商对所购中间产品、零部件进行二次加工,且二次加工过程中会影响中间产品质量时的最优质量合同设计问题,在上述研究的基础上,建立了产品结构相关情况下的收益模型,从而分析得出单边道德风险条件下的最优内、外部损失成本分摊系数,并进行了讨论分析。分析得出当供应商存在单边道德风险问题时,在购买商进行二次加工情况下,产品结构相关与否并不影响供应商所承担的内部损失成本。当购买商存在单边道德风险问题时,当发生内部损失的情况下,二次加工与否、产品结构相关与否都不影响供应商所承担的内部损失成本；而当发生外部故障时,产品结构独立时与不进行二次加工时的外部成本分担系数是一致的,产品结构的相关时,供应商将不会承担任何外部损失成本。
[Abstract]:Supply chain quality management is based on the internal quality management of the members of the supply chain, from the macro point of view to achieve the coordination of quality functions and quality activities among the member partners in the supply chain. Integration and optimization. Contract design based on product quality is the implementation method and approach of supply chain quality management. The product quality penalty contract and the product quality guarantee contract signed between supplier and buyer are one of them. And according to the project on which the contract is based, it can be divided into internal failure of supply chain and external supply chain. Breakdown of supply chain contracts. The internal fault is that the buyer detects the unqualified product when the intermediate product supplied by the supplier is inspected, while the external fault is that the unqualified intermediate product is not detected in the process of entering the factory. The core enterprises need contract management to restrain the actions of the members in the supply chain, reduce opportunism, and improve their cooperation enthusiasm and quality management efficiency. On the basis of summarizing the research results of supply chain quality management at home and abroad, this paper studies the secondary supply chain which is composed of a risk-neutral supplier and a risk-neutral purchaser. The main contents of the research on the design of quality contract are as follows: 1) Research on supply chain quality cost sharing contract without considering secondary processing. A two-level supply chain model with wholesale price as contract is established, and principal-agent method is used. Based on the optimal solution of the supply chain under the condition of information symmetry, the optimal internal and external loss cost sharing coefficients under three kinds of information asymmetry conditions are solved, and the optimal quality cost sharing contract is designed. An example is given. 2) Research on the independent quality cost sharing contract of product structure under secondary processing. The optimal quality contract design of the buyer is considered in the case of simple secondary processing. Based on the optimal solution of the supply chain under the condition of information symmetry, the optimal internal and external loss cost allocation coefficient in the case of unilateral moral hazard when the product structure is independent is solved. Research on the contract of quality cost sharing related to the product structure under the condition of secondary processing. This paper discusses the secondary processing of the parts and components for the intermediate products purchased by the purchaser. The optimal quality contract design problem in the process of secondary processing will affect the quality of intermediate products. On the basis of the above research, a profit model is established in the case of product structure correlation. Thus, the optimal internal and external loss cost allocation coefficient under unilateral moral hazard is obtained, and discussed and analyzed. The analysis shows that when the supplier has unilateral moral hazard problem. In the case of secondary processing, whether the product structure is related or not does not affect the cost of internal loss borne by the supplier. When the buyer has unilateral moral hazard, when there is internal loss. Whether the secondary processing or not, whether the product structure is relevant or not does not affect the internal loss cost borne by the supplier; When the external failure occurs, the external cost sharing coefficient is the same when the product structure is independent and the external cost sharing coefficient is the same when the product structure is not secondary processing. When the product structure is related, the supplier will not bear any external loss cost.
【学位授予单位】：青岛大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F274;F273.2

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