寄售模式下进场费和扣点的最优决策研究

发布时间：2018-02-27 05:26

本文关键词： 寄售进场费扣点优化博弈　出处：《南京理工大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：在经济全球化的市场条件下,零售商特别是零售业巨头的地位越发凸显,零售商凭借优势地位掌握着与制造商谈判和交易的主动权。面对不确定需求,零售商为了规避风险要求供应商采用寄售模式销售商品,并按照寄售契约中约定的比例从销售收益中获取提成。如何设计寄售契约,合理分配二者利润从而优化供应链引起了学者们的广泛关注。但是,在制造商和零售商决定合作之前往往还有一项重要的决策,即两者之间的相互选择与匹配问题。零售商可以通过制定合适的寄售政策(进场费和扣点的组合)筛选出对自身最有利的制造商集合；制造商可以通过比较不同的寄售政策,选择能够实现自身寄售利润最大化的零售商,从而实现市场资源的有效配置。现有研究对这一匹配过程的决策关注较少。在此背景下,本文研究了在制造商采取策略性选择的情况下,零售商如何制定合理的寄售政策借此选择合适的制造商集合以实现收益最大化。本文的研究主要包括以下三部分内容：第一,零售商垄断环境下,零售商面对多个制造商的最优寄售政策制定问题；第二,零售商竞争环境下,具有销量差异的零售商制定寄售政策的博弈；第三,零售商竞争环境下具有销量和成本双重差异的零售商寄售政策的博弈。针对第一个问题,建立了垄断零售商和多家制造商互选的混合整数规划模型,给出了零售商最优寄售政策的计算方法,通过算例分析探讨了进场费和扣点决策的一般性规律。针对后两个问题,分别建立了具有销量差异的零售商寄售政策博弈模型、具有销量和成本双重差异的零售商寄售政策博弈模型,通过重点分析两零售商-两制造商问题,给出了博弈的均衡解以及寄售政策的具体算法,通过算例分析讨论了竞争环境下强势零售商和弱势零售商决策的相互影响。研究发现：在零售商垄断市场上,由于制造商在产品价格、成本、销售规模等参数上具有不同特征,零售商通过调整进场费和扣点制定最优寄售政策可以大大提高自身的收益。在零售商竞争的市场上,强势零售商和实力强的制造商匹配,弱势零售商和实力偏弱的制造商匹配,而那些强势零售商和弱势零售商均未选择的制造商,一般都是利润和销量过低、缺乏市场竞争力的制造商。在寄售模式下,零售商的竞争一方面会导致零售商利润的下降,另一方面有助于市场资源的优化配置。
[Abstract]:Under the market conditions of economic globalization, the position of retailers, especially retail giants, is becoming more and more prominent. Retailers have the initiative to negotiate and trade with manufacturers by virtue of their dominant position. In order to avoid risks, retailers require suppliers to sell goods in consignment mode and earn a commission from the proceeds of sale according to the proportion agreed in the consignment contract. How to design consignment contract, The rational distribution of profit between the two and the optimization of the supply chain has attracted wide attention from scholars. However, there is often an important decision before manufacturers and retailers decide to cooperate. That is, the problem of mutual selection and matching between the two. Retailers can select the set of manufacturers that are most beneficial to them by formulating appropriate consignment policies (a combination of entry fees and deduction points); manufacturers can compare different consignment policies. In order to realize the efficient allocation of market resources, the existing researches pay less attention to the decision-making of this matching process. In this context, we choose the retailers that can maximize the profits of their consignment sales, and thus realize the effective allocation of market resources. This paper studies how to make a reasonable consignment policy to select the appropriate manufacturer set in order to maximize the profit under the strategic choice of the manufacturer. The research of this paper mainly includes the following three parts: first, retailers face the optimal consignment policy of multiple manufacturers in the monopoly environment of retailers; second, in the competitive environment of retailers, retailers face the problem of optimal consignment policy. Third, the game of retailer's consignment policy with different sales volume and cost under the competition environment. In this paper, a mixed integer programming model of monopoly retailers and multiple manufacturers is established, and the calculation method of retailer's optimal consignment policy is given. The general rules of entrance fee and deduction point decision are discussed through an example. The game model of retailer consignment policy with different sales volume is established, and the game model of retailer consignment policy with double difference of sales volume and cost is established, and the problem between two retailers and two manufacturers is analyzed. The equilibrium solution of the game and the concrete algorithm of the consignment policy are given, and the interaction between strong and weak retailers in competitive environment is discussed by an example. It is found that in the monopoly market of retailers, the manufacturer has different characteristics in the parameters of product price, cost, sales scale, etc. Retailers can greatly improve their earnings by adjusting entry fees and discount points to make optimal consignment policies. In a market where retailers compete, strong retailers match strong manufacturers, weak retailers match weak manufacturers. Manufacturers who are not selected by strong and weak retailers are generally manufacturers with low profits and sales and lack of market competitiveness. In consignment mode, retailers' competition will, on the one hand, lead to a decline in retailer profits. On the other hand, it helps to optimize the allocation of market resources.
【学位授予单位】：南京理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F713.3

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