机制设计理论视角下供应链战略合作伙伴关系治理的研究

发布时间：2018-02-27 12:29

本文关键词： 供应链战略合作伙伴关系治理机制设计理论信息不对称双重边际化　出处：《广东工业大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：二十世纪后半叶以来,随着科学技术的迅猛发展,经济的高速增长,经济全球化进程的加速,市场竞争环境发生了重大的变革,企业处于日益复杂多变的竞争环境当中。借助供应链上下游企业的力量,建立供应链战略合作伙伴关系,整合各成员企业的优势资源,是处在竞争当中的供应链企业为实现可持续发展而进行的一种战略选择。供应链成员企业间建立战略合作伙伴关系,即供应链中相互独立的上下游企业之间基于信任和共同的目标,而共享资源、共担分险、共同获利的非正式长期协议关系,但是由于其中存在着集体理性与成员企业个体理性之间的对立统一,各成员企业间的关系在本质上仍然是委托-代理关系,信息不对称与双重边际化有可能导致合作伙伴关系运行不协调。因此,我们要对供应链战略合作伙伴关系进行治理,引入合理的机制促使成员企业在满足个体收益的同时供应链整体收益也达到了最优值。因此,本文从机制设计理论的视角下研究供应链战略合作伙伴关系的治理,具有理论和实践意义。机制设计理论是博弈论与社会选择理论的综合运用,主要研究在信息不对称、决策分散、自由选择的条件下基于某种目标如何设计一个激励相容系统使得成员的决策和行为与整体目标相一致,重点解决信息不对称和激励不相容这两大问题。供应链的系统特征与其相符,因此,机制设计理论为我们提供了新颖的研究视角和很好的思路方法。本文在分析了供应链战略合作伙伴关系相关问题的基础上,基于机制设计理论对供应链战略合作伙伴关系的治理进行了分析和探讨。首先提出了基于成本控制、激励相容以及信任机制的治理框架,然后分别对三部分进行了探讨阐述。为防范信息不对称可能引起的逆向选择风险,研究了信息不对称条件下的供应链合作伙伴的甄别与选择。运用机制设计理论的显示原理设计了能激励供应商揭示自身真实类型的合约机制,构建了一个由初始支付、奖励和惩罚三部分构成的支付合约模型,从而促使供应商在选择合约的过程中就能主动揭示自身的真实类型。为降低由激励不相容导致的双重边际化造成的不良影响,应用了机制设计理论的分支理论博弈论的Shapely值法探讨供应链合作伙伴收益分配机制的设计。为保证供应链战略合作伙伴关系的健康稳定发展,除了解决上述两大问题外,还需要信任机制作为“粘合剂”,因此本文也讨论了供应链战略合作伙伴关系信任机制的构建。为促使供应链上各成员了解和客观准确地评价供应链绩效,从而合理运用激励、帮助、奖惩等手段实现治理目标,本文探讨了供应链绩效评价的作用、含义、原则、评价系统的框架与模型。总的来说,本文尝试从机制设计理论的视角来研究供应链战略合作伙伴关系的治理,从而促进供应链整体的协调运行。
[Abstract]:Since the second half of 20th century, with the rapid development of science and technology, the rapid growth of economy, the acceleration of the process of economic globalization, the market competition environment has undergone major changes. The enterprise is in the increasingly complex and changeable competition environment. With the strength of the upstream and downstream enterprises in the supply chain, the strategic partnership of the supply chain is established to integrate the superior resources of each member enterprise. It is a strategic choice for supply chain enterprises in competition to realize sustainable development. Establishing strategic partnership among supply chain member enterprises, that is, the informal long-term agreement relationship between the independent upstream and downstream enterprises in the supply chain based on trust and common goal, sharing resources, sharing risks, and making common profits. However, due to the unity of opposites between collective rationality and individual rationality of member enterprises, the relationship among member enterprises is still principal-agent relationship in essence. Asymmetric information and double marginalization can lead to uncoordinated partnerships. Therefore, we need to govern supply chain strategic partnerships. The introduction of reasonable mechanism promotes the member enterprises to meet the individual income and achieve the optimal value of the whole supply chain. Therefore, this paper studies the governance of supply chain strategic partnership from the perspective of mechanism design theory. It has theoretical and practical significance. The theory of mechanism design is a comprehensive application of game theory and social choice theory. How to design an incentive compatible system based on a certain objective under the condition of free choice so that the decision and behavior of the members are consistent with the overall goal, The system characteristics of supply chain are consistent with the information asymmetry and incentive incompatibility. Therefore, the mechanism design theory provides us with a new perspective and a good way of thinking. Based on the analysis of supply chain strategic partnership, this paper analyzes and discusses the governance of supply chain strategic partnership based on the theory of mechanism design. In order to prevent the risk of adverse selection caused by asymmetric information, the governance framework of incentive compatibility and trust mechanism is discussed in this paper. This paper studies the selection and identification of supply chain partners under asymmetric information, designs a contract mechanism that can motivate suppliers to reveal their true types by using the display principle of mechanism design theory, and constructs an initial payment mechanism. In order to reduce the adverse effects caused by the double marginalization caused by incentive incompatibility, the payment contract model composed of three parts of reward and punishment enables suppliers to proactively reveal their true types in the process of selecting contracts. In order to ensure the healthy and stable development of strategic partnership of supply chain, the Shapely value method of game theory of branch theory of mechanism design is applied to discuss the design of profit distribution mechanism of supply chain partners. Trust mechanism is also needed as "glue", so this paper also discusses the construction of supply chain strategic partnership trust mechanism. In order to promote the members of supply chain to understand and evaluate supply chain performance objectively and accurately, so as to make rational use of incentives. This paper discusses the function, meaning, principle, framework and model of supply chain performance evaluation. In general, this paper attempts to study the governance of supply chain strategic partnership from the perspective of mechanism design theory, thus promoting the coordinated operation of the supply chain as a whole.
【学位授予单位】：广东工业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F274

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