政府引导下回收投资成本分担对闭环供应链决策的影响
本文选题:闭环供应链 切入点:奖惩机制 出处:《中国矿业大学》2017年硕士论文 论文类型:学位论文
【摘要】:在全面贯彻十八大和十八届五中全会精神,贯彻推进生态文明和绿色发展的决策部署,坚持五大发展理念,以加快转变发展方式,促进行业转型升级为主线的大环境下,我国重点强调生产制造业全面履行生产者延伸责任制,负责产品整个生命周期,特别是关于废旧电子产品的回收再加工问题。因此,闭环供应链管理成为规范废旧电子产品回收再制造的重要途径。本文运用动态博弈、静态博弈、最优化等方法对制造商分担回收投资成本及奖惩机制作用这两种规制方法下第三方负责回收的闭环供应链的定价决策进行研究。首先,建立了闭环供应链集中式情形、分散式情形下无回收投资成本分担情形、制造商分担固定回收投资成本情形及制造商分担单位回收成本情形。通过解析分析与解析解的比较得到以下主要结论:1、制造商担负回收投资可以降低回购价及正向销售价格,提高回收率,制造商、零售商的利润均提升,当制造商担负比例较小时,回收商的利润也会提高。2、制造商分担单位回收成本仅对回购价起作用,对其它决策变量无任何作用。其次,为了使回收率达到集中式情形,本文又考虑了政府奖惩机制,分别建立了仅考虑奖惩机制模型、奖惩机制下制造商担负回收投资模型,通过解析分析及解析解的比较得到以下主要结论:1、在引入政府奖惩机制后,能够提高回购价,降低正向销售价格,提高废旧电器电子产品的回收率,且当奖惩力度满足一定条件时,回收率高于集中式情形。2、奖惩机制与制造商担负回收投资成本联合作用后,在适当的奖惩力度及制造商担负比例下,该机制的作用效果优于仅考虑奖惩机制或是仅考虑制造商担负回收投资成本情形,并且此时的奖惩力度是仅考虑奖惩机制时回收率达到集中式水平时奖惩力度值的1/3即能达到集中式水平。最后,在上述模型基础上考虑企业社会责任,通过对模型求解、解析解分析及数值仿真发现:在供应链各成员考虑企业社会责任后,有利于提高消费者对产品和企业的认可度,增加市场需求量,提高废旧电器电子产品的回收率,并且闭环供应链各成员的利润也得到提高。
[Abstract]:Under the general environment of comprehensively implementing the spirit of the Fifth Plenary session of the 18 and 18 CPC Central Committees, carrying out the decision-making arrangements for promoting ecological civilization and green development, adhering to the five development concepts, and taking speeding up the transformation of development mode and promoting the transformation and upgrading of the industry as the main line, Our emphasis is on the full implementation of the extended producer responsibility system in the manufacturing sector, which is responsible for the entire life cycle of the product, especially with regard to the recycling and reprocessing of used and end-of-life electronic products. Closed-loop supply chain management has become an important way to standardize the recycling and remanufacturing of used electronic products. Optimization and other methods are used to study the pricing decision of the closed-loop supply chain in which the third party is responsible for the recovery under the two regulation methods of the manufacturer sharing the cost of recovery investment and the role of reward and punishment mechanism. Firstly, the centralized situation of the closed-loop supply chain is established. In the case of decentralized investment without sharing the cost of the recovered investment, By comparing the analytic analysis with the analytic solution, the following main conclusions: 1. The manufacturer can reduce the repo price and the forward sales price by taking charge of the recovery investment, and by comparing the analytical analysis with the analytic solution, the manufacturer shares the fixed recovery investment cost and the unit recovery cost. With the increase of recovery rate, the profits of manufacturers and retailers are all increased. When the manufacturers bear a smaller proportion, the profits of recyclers will also increase by 0.2. The manufacturer's share of unit recovery costs will only play a role in the repo price. Secondly, in order to make the recovery rate reach the centralized situation, this paper also considers the government reward and punishment mechanism, establishes the model of only considering the reward and punishment mechanism, under the reward and punishment mechanism, the manufacturer takes charge of the recovery investment model. Through the comparison of analytical analysis and analytical solution, the following main conclusions are drawn: 1. After introducing the mechanism of government reward and punishment, the repo price can be raised, the positive sale price can be reduced, and the recovery rate of used electrical and electronic products can be increased. And when the rewards and punishments meet certain conditions, the recovery rate is higher than that of centralized cases. After the combination of reward and punishment mechanism and manufacturer bear the recovery of investment cost, under the appropriate reward and punishment strength and manufacturer burden ratio, The effect of this mechanism is better than that of only considering the reward and punishment mechanism or only considering that the manufacturer bears the cost of recovering the investment. And at this time, the reward and punishment strength is only 1/3 when the recovery rate reaches the centralized level when the reward and punishment mechanism is considered. Finally, on the basis of the above model, the corporate social responsibility is considered, and the model is solved by solving the model. The analytical solution analysis and numerical simulation show that after the members of the supply chain consider the corporate social responsibility, it is beneficial to improve the consumers' recognition of the products and enterprises, increase the market demand, and increase the recovery rate of the used electrical and electronic products. And the profit of each member of the closed-loop supply chain is also improved.
【学位授予单位】:中国矿业大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2017
【分类号】:F274
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