议价的OEM供应链在随机供需下的协调决策

发布时间：2018-03-19 22:26

本文选题：供应链协调　切入点：博弈论　出处：《管理科学学报》2014年05期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：品牌企业在与OEM供应商建立合作关系前,需要经过议价谈判达成交易意向,并且在做生产订货决策时,需要考虑需求与供应的随机性带来的风险.随机需求源于难以预测市场消费,随机供应来自产品质量缺陷等原因,供需两端的随机性无疑给企业决策增添了难度.针对议价谈判中存在的信息不对称,提出了基于Bayesian博弈的议价谈判模型,证明了存在一个均衡价格,该价格是双方达成交易意向的最佳条件.而后,根据需求和供应的随机性特点,构建了分散决策下品牌企业和OEM供应商的利润函数,证明了该函数是凹函数,运用Stackelberg博弈求解出双方的最优批量决策.分析了集中决策下OEM供应链的利润最大化条件,以此为优化目标,引入带缺货惩罚的额外收购契约.品牌企业可以根据OEM供应商的生产数量实行缺货惩罚或额外收购,通过调整契约的参数,实现OEM供应链协调.
[Abstract]:Before establishing a cooperative relationship with OEM suppliers, brand enterprises need to negotiate through negotiation to reach a deal intention, and when making the production order decision, Need to consider the risk of randomness of demand and supply. Random demand comes from difficult to predict market consumption, random supply from product quality defects and other reasons, The randomness at both ends of supply and demand undoubtedly increases the difficulty of enterprise decision-making. In view of the information asymmetry in bargaining negotiation, a bargaining negotiation model based on Bayesian game is proposed, which proves the existence of a equilibrium price. The price is the best condition for both parties to reach a transaction intention. Then, according to the randomness of demand and supply, the profit function of brand enterprise and OEM supplier under decentralized decision is constructed, and it is proved that the function is concave function. The Stackelberg game is used to solve the optimal batch decision of both parties. The profit maximization condition of OEM supply chain under centralized decision is analyzed. According to the production quantity of OEM supplier, the brand enterprise can carry out the penalty of out of stock or extra purchase, and realize the coordination of OEM supply chain by adjusting the parameters of the contract.
【作者单位】：中山大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70972079)
【分类号】：F274

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