考虑公平关切及其谈判破裂点的供应链运作

发布时间：2018-03-19 23:04

本文选题：Nash讨价还价解　切入点：谈判破裂点　出处：《管理科学学报》2017年10期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：将考虑谈判破裂点的Nash解作为公平参考点,构建了基于Stackelberg博弈的公平关切供应链模型,分别在批发价契约和回购契约中探讨了供应链的决策和协调问题,分析了谈判破裂点对公平关切供应链的影响.研究发现:当批发价分别为外生、内生变量时,谈判破裂点对最优订货量的影响是完全相反的.此外,在批发价契约和回购契约中,基于Stackelberg博弈的公平关切供应链均无法协调,继而文章采用价格补贴的方式进行联合契约设计使供应链达到协调.
[Abstract]:Considering the Nash solution of negotiation breakout point as the fair reference point, this paper constructs a fair concern supply chain model based on Stackelberg game, and discusses the decision-making and coordination of supply chain in wholesale price contract and repurchase contract, respectively. This paper analyzes the effect of negotiation break-up point on the supply chain of equity concern. It is found that when the wholesale price is exogenous and endogenous, the effect of negotiation breakout point on the optimal order quantity is completely opposite. In the wholesale price contract and the repurchase contract, the fair concern supply chain based on Stackelberg game can not be coordinated.
【作者单位】：中国科学技术大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71601175;71571171) 教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划资助项目(NCET-13-0538) 中国科学院青年创新促进会专项基金资助项目(2015364)
【分类号】：F274

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