基于服务质量的导游动态激励机制研究

发布时间：2018-03-23 18:19

本文选题：旅游服务供应链　切入点：服务质量　出处：《湖南工业大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：随着旅游业的飞速发展，人民生活水平的不断提高，游客越来越注重旅游的真实体验和旅游过程中的切实感受，对旅游服务质量的要求也越来越高。中国首部《旅游法》的实施，开启了中国旅游业走出零负团费和强迫购物的畸形发展之路，新《旅游法》在一定程度上也引领了游客更加重视旅游服务质量，旅行社迎来了转型定位和规范服务的新挑战，旅行社必须以优质的服务来赢得挑战。而导游作为连接游客与旅行社之间的桥梁和旅游服务的直接提供者，是整个旅游活动的轴心，其服务质量直接影响游客感知的旅游服务质量。设计激励机制充分激励导游发挥工作积极性、提高服务质量是旅行社面临的现实问题。本文从旅游服务质量的角度对导游激励机制进行研究，综合运用管理学、委托代理理论、声誉理论和激励机制理论等多学科理论方法，分别从导游的显性激励和隐性激励两个方面对导游激励机制进行了系统研究。首先阐述了论文的研究背景，指出了设计能有效激励导游努力提高服务质量的激励机制的重要性和必要性，对相关研究现状进行了回顾和述评。相关理论部分主要是对论文研究所涉及到的理论进行说明介绍，理清了旅游服务供应链中旅行社的核心地位、委托代理理论中代理人横向和纵向多任务的概念、激励机制理论中显性激励机制和隐性激励机制理论的特点等。接下来针对导游工作的特性，探讨基于服务质量的导游显性激励机制的设计问题，建立了一个显性激励机制——二阶段动态激励契约，与没有考虑服务质量投入的单周期静态契约进行比较分析。进一步在第三章显性激励机制的基础上，为缓解导游提供低服务质量的道德风险，继续研究旅游服务供应链中旅行社和导游的多期合作背景下，导游服务质量的决策问题，通过建立一个隐性激励机制——导游多周期动态声誉模型，来弥补显性激励机制的不足，对声誉模型的隐性激励作用进行分析，找出临界条件，，揭示导游声誉模型演化机理。最后对全文进行总结和指出下一步的研究展望。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of tourism and the continuous improvement of people's living standards, tourists pay more and more attention to the real experience of tourism and the real feelings in the process of tourism. The implementation of China's first "Tourism Law" has opened the door for China's tourism industry to go out of the way. The deformed development road of zero negative tour fee and forced shopping, the new "Tourism Law" has also led tourists to pay more attention to the quality of tourism service to a certain extent, and the travel agency has ushered in a new challenge of transforming its orientation and standardizing its service. Travel agencies must win the challenge with good service, and tour guides, as a bridge between tourists and travel agencies and direct providers of tourism services, are the axis of the entire tourism activity. The service quality directly affects the tourism service quality perceived by tourists, and the incentive mechanism is designed to encourage tour guides to give full play to their work enthusiasm. Improving the service quality is the realistic problem that the travel agency faces. This paper studies the tour guide incentive mechanism from the tourism service quality angle, synthetically uses the management science, the principal-agent theory, the reputation theory and the incentive mechanism theory and so on multi-disciplinary theory method. The incentive mechanism of tour guide is studied systematically from two aspects: explicit incentive and implicit incentive. Firstly, this paper expounds the research background, points out the importance and necessity of the incentive mechanism which can effectively motivate tour guides to improve service quality, and reviews the current research situation. The related theory part mainly introduces the theories involved in the paper, clarifies the core position of the travel agency in the tourism service supply chain, and the concept of horizontal and vertical multi-task agent in the principal-agent theory. The characteristics of explicit incentive mechanism and implicit incentive mechanism theory in incentive mechanism theory. Then, according to the characteristics of tour guide work, this paper discusses the design of dominant incentive mechanism based on service quality, and establishes a dominant incentive mechanism, which is a two-stage dynamic incentive contract. It is compared with single cycle static contract without quality of service input. On the basis of the dominant incentive mechanism in Chapter 3, in order to alleviate the moral hazard of low service quality, we continue to study the decision-making of tour guide service quality in the context of multi-stage cooperation between travel agency and tour guide in the tourism service supply chain. In order to make up for the deficiency of dominant incentive mechanism, a recessive incentive mechanism, a dynamic reputation model for tour guides, is established. The recessive incentive effect of reputation model is analyzed, the critical conditions are found out, and the evolution mechanism of tour guide reputation model is revealed. Finally, the paper summarizes the full text and points out the future research prospects.
【学位授予单位】：湖南工业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F272.92;F592.6

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