不同渠道和信息条件下闭环供应链的协调与激励研究

发布时间：2018-03-24 09:15

本文选题：闭环供应链　切入点：渠道　出处：《江苏大学》2014年博士论文

【摘要】：进入21世纪以来,随着科学技术的不断发展和人们生活水平的日益提高,产品的生命周期日渐缩短,废旧产品越来越多,伴随而来的资源危机和环境问题变得日益突出。因此,大力发展循环经济,保持社会可持续发展,构建资源节约型、环境友好型社会就成为一项迫在眉睫的战略性问题。而循环再制造工程是实现循环经济、缓解资源短缺和可持续发展的主要途径之一。对废旧产品的回收再制造也日益成为现代企业重要的战略运作方式。有关闭环供应链系统各节点企业之间的定价及协调机制的设计研究,对于提升供应链系统的整体优势和绩效等方面,都具有非常重要的理论意义和现实意义。尽管闭环供应链的研究已经引起人们的高度重视,出现了一些研究成果,但是还没有形成完整的理论体系。人们通过对闭环供应链系统进行建模研究了许多的定价和协调模型,但这些模型绝大部分基于市场需求确定、信息对称等情况下的研究,与闭环供应链系统运作的实践存在着较大的差距,从而使得这些研究难以提高它的理论指导能力。本文从实际出发,充分考虑更为接近现实的各种情况,在复杂的实际环境下,如多渠道的回收、销售渠道和回收渠道之间的冲突、双重信息不对称等等,构建相应的定价决策模型进行分析和研究,并进一步探讨了闭环供应链系统中各节点企业的协调、激励机制,以实现闭环供应链的整体最优。其主要研究内容如下：论文首先对闭环供应链及其协调的理论基础进行研究。其中包括：闭环供应链的内涵以及与传统供应链相比的所独有的特点；闭环供应链的结构和关键流程的分析,在此基础上进一步对闭环供应链运作的模式和协调模式进行了分析；对博弈论、委托代理理论、显示原理等进行了系统的阐述,为后续的协调和激励机制的设计奠定了理论依据。接着,分别研究了信息对称情况下闭环供应链系统的定价和契约协调设计问题。随着电子商务和信息技术的不断发展,混合渠道的销售和回收成为可能。基于这种实际情况,通过构建渠道冲突下闭环供应链的定价模型,对不同回收渠道的闭环供应链进行了分析,探讨了各成员的最优定价策略和利润,提出了一种改进的价格折扣契约,实现了闭环供应链系统的整体优化和提升。以制造商和零售商的混合回收渠道为研究对象,构建了不同渠道权力结构下闭环供应链的决策模型,对各种模型下的定价决策进行了比较分析,提出运用两部定价契约机制来实现不同渠道权力结构下闭环供应链的协调。最后,通过数值仿真对模型的各种结论进行了验证。基于随机环境下,废旧产品的回收量受到回收商的努力水平影响时,运用委托代理理论分析出现单边道德风险下契约的设计问题,考虑如何设计契约来激励回收商更加努力地工作。在此基础上,进一步考虑了废旧产品的回收量同时受到回收商和制造商的努力水平影响时,即出现双边道德风险下契约的设计问题,通过设立一个更具有一般性的投入产出函数(柯布道格拉斯函数)研究制造商和回收商双方在合作回收的过程中,最优契约的设计以及契约中参数的影响因素。最后,通过数值仿真分析了契约设计中各参数的特点。在前面研究的基础上,探讨了双重信息不对称条件下闭环供应链的激励机制设计。当废旧产品的回收过程中同时出现逆向选择和道德风险时,利用委托代理理论和信号甄别原理,制造商如何设计激励契约实现双目标的混合激励,分析了最优激励契约的特征,并与单一信息不对称时的激励契约进行比较分析。特别是当不对称信息为连续型变量时,通过对传统激励契约的改进,构建一种新的激励机制模型,并对模型中的参数进行分析。论文中所得出的结论能为闭环供应链中企业的决策实践提供有用的理论依据。
[Abstract]:Since twenty-first Century, with the development of science and technology and the increasing of people's living standard, the product life cycle is becoming shorter, more and more waste products, along with the energy crisis and environmental problems become increasingly prominent. Therefore, vigorously develop the circular economy, maintain social sustainable development, build a resource-saving and environment-friendly society become a strategic problem imminent. Recycling remanufacturing engineering is the realization of circular economy, one of the main ways to alleviate the shortage of resources and sustainable development. Making the recycling has become a modern enterprise important strategic operation mode. The design research on the pricing and coordination mechanism between node enterprises on the closed-loop supply chain system. To improve the supply chain system, the overall advantages and performance, has very important theoretical significance and practical significance Righteousness.
Although the research of closed-loop supply chain has attracted people's attention, there have been some research results, but has not formed a complete theoretical system. It was studied by many of the pricing and coordination model of the closed-loop supply chain system modeling, but most of these models are determined based on the market demand, research on information asymmetry condition and there is a big gap with the practical operation of the closed-loop supply chain system, which makes these studies difficult to improve its theoretical guidance ability. In this paper, considering the various situations is more close to reality, in the complex environment, such as the recovery of multiple channels, the conflict between sales channels and recycling channels the dual information asymmetry, construction analysis and research of pricing decision model, and further discusses the coordination of each node enterprises in the closed-loop supply chain system, Incentive mechanism to achieve the overall optimal closed-loop supply chain. The main research contents are as follows:
Firstly, the theoretical basis of the closed-loop supply chain and the coordination of the study. Including the definition of the closed-loop supply chain, compared with the traditional supply chain's unique characteristics; analysis of the structure and key processes of the closed-loop supply chain, analyzed on the basis of closed-loop supply chain operation mode and the mode of coordination; game theory, principal-agent theory, display principle of the system is discussed, which provides a theoretical basis for the design for the coordination and incentive mechanism.
Then, the system of closed-loop supply chain under symmetric information, pricing and contract coordination design problems were studied. With the continuous development of e-commerce and information technology, hybrid channel sales and recovery possible. Based on the actual situation, the pricing model of closed loop supply chain through the construction of channel conflict in the recovery of the closed-loop supply chain the channels are analyzed, discussed the optimal pricing strategy and the profit of each member, and proposes an improved price discount contract, to achieve the overall optimization and upgrading of the closed-loop supply chain system. The hybrid recycling channels of manufacturers and retailers as the research object, constructs the decision model of closed-loop supply chain under different channel power structures of all, the pricing decision models are compared and analyzed, put forward to use the two part pricing contract mechanism to achieve different channel power structure of closed-loop supply chain Finally, all kinds of conclusions of the model are verified by numerical simulation.
Based on the random environment, the recovery rate of waste products affected by the recycling business effort level, using the principal-agent theory analysis and design problem of the single moral hazard under contract, how to design the contract in order to encourage recycling operators to work harder. On this basis, to further consider the recovery of waste products is also affected by the recycling business and the manufacturer's effort level, which is the design problem of double moral hazard contract, through the establishment of a more general input-output function (Cobb Douglas function) of manufacturers and recyclers in the process of cooperation both in recovery, as well as the influence factors of optimal contract design contract parameters. Finally, through numerical simulation and analysis of the characteristics of each parameter in the design of the contract.
On the basis of previous research, discusses the design of incentive mechanism of closed loop supply chain under dual information asymmetry condition. At the same time when the adverse selection and moral hazard in the recycling process of waste products, by using the principal-agent theory and signal screening principle, the manufacturer how to design incentive contract to achieve the goal of double mixing, analyzes the characteristics of optimal incentive the contract, and compare with the single information asymmetry incentive contract. Especially when the information asymmetry is a continuous variable, through the improvement of the traditional incentive contract, construct a new incentive mechanism model, and the parameters of the model are analyzed. The conclusions of the paper can provide useful theoretical basis for the practice of decision-making in the closed-loop supply chain.

【学位授予单位】：江苏大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F274

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