需求依赖努力的批发价格契约协调——基于公平偏好信息非对称的分析

发布时间：2018-03-25 03:20

本文选题：公平偏好　切入点：信息非对称　出处：《商业研究》2017年08期

【摘要】：本文在考虑公平偏好信息非对称下研究需求依赖努力的批发价格契约对零供博弈和供应链的影响。研究发现:当零售商为完全理性类型时,信息对称下的努力水平低于非对称情形,当零售商为公平偏好类型时,信息对称下的努力水平高于非对称情形;当零售商的公平偏好强度足够大或者当零售商完全理性且信息非对称时,零售商利润会超过处于先动优势的供应商利润;无论公平偏好信息是否对称,批发价格契约不能消除但能缓减"双重边际问题"且起到供应链利润分配机制的作用。本研究对现有供应链契约研究的某些理论分析进行了完善,并修改了某些研究结论。
[Abstract]:Considering the asymmetry of fair preference information, this paper studies the effect of wholesale price contract of demand dependence on zero-supply game and supply chain. It is found that when the retailer is a completely rational type, The level of effort under information symmetry is lower than that under asymmetric situation. When the retailer is the type of fair preference, the level of effort under information symmetry is higher than that under asymmetric situation. When the retailer's fair preference is strong enough or when the retailer is completely rational and the information is asymmetric, the retailer's profit will exceed that of the supplier in the preemptive advantage, regardless of whether the fair preference information is symmetrical or not, The wholesale price contract can not eliminate but alleviate the "double marginal problem" and play the role of profit distribution mechanism of supply chain. This study has perfected some theoretical analysis of the existing supply chain contract research and modified some research conclusions.
【作者单位】：重庆理工大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家社科基金项目“基于社会偏好及其认知动态演进的供应链契约优化与协调”,项目编号:16CGL017
【分类号】：F274;F724.2

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