批发价格与收益共享合约并存下的供应链信息泄露研究

发布时间：2018-03-29 19:31

本文选题：信息泄露　切入点：供应链　出处：《运筹与管理》2017年06期

【摘要】：信息泄露是供应链企业之间进行信息共享的障碍之一,本文考虑供应商与在位者零售商、进入者零售商之间缔结不同类型合约下的信息泄露问题。鉴于供应商与在位者之间具有较长期的合作关系,他们之间以收益共享合约进行交易,而考虑到进入者零售商新进入此市场,他与供应商之间以批发价格合约进行交易。基于信号博弈的研究框架,分析了此设定下所导致的纯策略完美贝叶斯均衡,并给出了分离均衡、混同均衡以及非泄露均衡出现的条件。研究发现,当供应商与在位者之间的收益共享比例和供应商向进入者提供的批发价格满足一定条件时,供应商有动机不泄露在位者的订货量信息,即出现非泄露均衡。最后,通过数值算例对在位者、进入者以及供应商在分离均衡和非泄露均衡中的利润进行了比较分析。
[Abstract]:Information leakage is one of the obstacles to information sharing among supply chain enterprises. The problem of information disclosure under different types of contracts concluded between entrants and retailers. In view of the longer term relationship between suppliers and incumbents, they trade in revenue-sharing contracts, Considering the entrant retailer's new entry into the market, he deals with the supplier with wholesale price contract. Based on the research framework of signal game, the pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium is analyzed. The conditions for the emergence of separation equilibrium, mixed equilibrium and non-leakage equilibrium are given. It is found that when the profit sharing ratio between the supplier and the incumbent and the wholesale price offered by the supplier to the entrant meet certain conditions, The supplier has the motive not to disclose the order quantity information of the incumbent, that is, the non-leakage equilibrium. Finally, the profit of the incumbent, the entrant and the supplier in the separation equilibrium and the non-leakage equilibrium are compared and analyzed by numerical examples.
【作者单位】：华东理工大学商学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71202052,71471062,71573087,71431004,71473085) 教育部人文社会科学研究规划青年基金资助项目(12YJC630240) 中央高校基本科研业务费基金
【分类号】：F274;O236

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