不确定市场需求下的制造商销售渠道选择

发布时间：2018-04-03 05:02

本文选题：渠道选择　切入点：串谋　出处：《华北电力大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：互联网为众多厂家提供了一种新的网络直销渠道，也给顾客提供了新的了解和获取产品的机会。网络直销渠道的出现引起与传统零售渠道的冲突和竞争，增加了供应链运作的复杂性。在是否增设网络直销渠道的问题上，厂商的态度并不一致，学者们也持有不同观点。本文先对制造商销售渠道的相关理论进行了阐述。然后在Li的模型基础上，引入制造商关于市场需求的私人信息，在市场需求不确定的前提条件下，，研究了由一个制造商和多个零售商构成的二层供应链，并利用数量竞争来描述网络直销渠道与传统零售渠道之间的竞争形式。采用博弈论的方法分析了单零售渠道和双渠道结构下制造商和零售商之间的动态博弈行为，并在此基础上试图回答何时制造商会选择增设网络直销渠道。同时对垂直信息共享、水平信息共享和串谋三种信息共享行为对制造商和零售商之间产生的影响进行了分析。研究结论表明，只有当直销边际成本较小时，制造商才会选择增设直销渠道，而且当对市场需求的把握程度越高时，制造商就越倾向于增设直销渠道。在双渠道结构下零售商不愿意与制造商和其他零售商共享私人信息，而零售商之间是否串谋取决于制造商的边际直销成本。当边际直销成本小于某一特定值时零售商选择串谋，否则零售商不串谋。
[Abstract]:The Internet provides many manufacturers with a new channel for direct marketing, and also provides customers with a new understanding and access to products.The emergence of network direct selling channels leads to conflicts and competition with traditional retail channels, which increases the complexity of supply chain operation.On whether to add network direct selling channel, the manufacturer's attitude is not consistent, the scholar also holds the different view.In this paper, first of all, the manufacturer of sales channels related to the theory is expounded.Then on the basis of Li's model, the author introduces the private information about the market demand of the manufacturer. Under the premise of uncertain market demand, the two-layer supply chain composed of one manufacturer and several retailers is studied.And use the quantity competition to describe the competition form between the network direct selling channel and the traditional retail channel.This paper analyzes the dynamic game behavior between manufacturer and retailer under the structure of single retail channel and double channel by using the method of game theory, and tries to answer when the manufacturer will choose to add network direct selling channel.At the same time, the effects of vertical information sharing, horizontal information sharing and collusion on manufacturers and retailers are analyzed.The research results show that only when the marginal cost of direct selling is small, the manufacturer will choose to increase the channel of direct selling, and the higher the degree of grasping the market demand, the more inclined the manufacturer is to increase the channel of direct selling.Retailers are reluctant to share private information with manufacturers and other retailers under a dual channel structure, and whether retailers collude depends on the marginal direct selling costs of manufacturers.When the marginal direct selling cost is less than a certain value, the retailer chooses collusion, otherwise the retailer does not collude.
【学位授予单位】：华北电力大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F274;F424

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