消费者角度下的食品供应链质量激励与监管机制

发布时间：2018-04-03 06:00

本文选题：食品供应链　切入点：消费者购买决策　出处：《南京工业大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：近年来食品质量问题事件频发，食品安全成为人们关注的焦点。处于食品供应链末端的消费者往往成为食品安全问题的受害者，因此，消费者有动机促进食品安全质量提高，以维护自身的利益。本文基于消费者角度，应用消费者行为学和博弈论分析食品安全问题产生的原因，研究消费者如何通过购买决策行为促进食品供应链中食品质量提高，以及消费者反馈机制下政府监管如何发挥保证食品安全的作用。论文首先介绍了供应链管理和消费者行为学等相关理论概念，并对供应链协调、食品安全和供应链成员行为等相关文献进行梳理归纳，为后续研究奠定了理论基础。食品交易市场中，食品消费者和食品生产企业之间存在信号博弈，消费者从食品市场上收集食品质量信息，以此为基础作出购买决策。讨论了信号博弈三种均衡成立的条件，给出了消费者的最优购买策略，并分析了食品质量安全产生的原因。研究指出，为促进食品质量安全，政府部门应该增加监管力度，对生产高质量食品企业予以奖励和补助，，并建立和完善食品市场的准入制度。通过引入了消费者“品位参数”，考察一个由生产商、零售商和消费者组成的食品供应链，分析消费者如何通过购买行为促进食品供应链中食品质量提高。研究发现消费者购买选择行为能促进零售商之间的竞争，并促使零售商销售的食品质量水平稳步提高，最终零售商共同平分整个市场利润。进一步地，建立对生产商与零售商的Stackelberg博弈模型，分析表明引入收入共享契约能够实现食品供应链协调。收入共享契约下，消费者花费更少的货币能获得与分散式决策供应链相同质量水平的食品，则理性消费者都会选择该契约下供应链提供的食品，从而有利于促进提升食品供应链中食品质量水平。消费者反馈机制下的政府监管如何促进食品质量提高呢？消费者在购买、消费、体验食品后及时将信息反馈给政府监管部门，政府监管部门据此实施监管，对食品企业进行奖惩措施。在食品企业和政府监管部门之间的监管博弈中引入奖惩机制，研究表明：提高政府监管部门对食品企业生产不安全食品的罚金，短期内能够使食品企业生产安全食品的概率增大，但长期会使政府监管部门降低实施监管的概率，产生监管悖论。通过委托—代理理论打破悖论，提高对于失职的政府监管部门的问责惩罚，有利于提高政府监管的效率。研究还指出，政府监管部门给予食品企业物质奖励在短期内会产生负效应，但是长期来看能够产生促使生产企业规范生产安全食品的正效应。最后对全文进行了简要的总结和归纳，并对进一步的研究方向进行了探讨。
[Abstract]:Food safety has become the focus of food safety in recent years . Consumers at the end of food supply chain tend to be the victims of food safety . Therefore , consumers have incentive to promote food safety quality and maintain their own interests . Based on consumers ' perspective , consumer behavior and game theory are used to analyze the causes of food safety problems .

Firstly , the concepts of supply chain management and consumer behavior are introduced , and relevant documents such as supply chain coordination , food safety and supply chain members are summarized and summarized , which lays a theoretical foundation for the subsequent research .

In the food trade market , there is a signal game between the food consumer and the food production enterprise . The consumers collect the food quality information from the food market , so as to make the purchase decision on the basis of this . The paper discusses the condition of three equilibrium of signal game , gives the optimal purchase strategy of consumers , and analyses the causes of food quality safety . The research points out that in order to promote the safety of food quality , the government department should increase the supervision force , reward and supplement the high - quality food enterprises , and establish and perfect the access system of food market .

Based on the introduction of consumer ' s " grade parameter " , a food supply chain composed of manufacturers , retailers and consumers is investigated , and how consumers can promote food quality in the food supply chain through purchasing behavior is analyzed .

How to improve the quality of food by the government regulation under the consumer feedback mechanism ? The consumers pay back the information to the government regulators in time after purchasing , consuming and experiencing food . In the short term , the government regulators implement supervision and reward and punish the food enterprises . The research shows that the government supervision department can reduce the probability of implementing supervision , and it is beneficial to improve the efficiency of government supervision . The research also points out that the government regulator gives food enterprises material rewards to produce negative effects in the short term , but can produce positive effects that can impel the production enterprises to regulate the production safety food in the long term .

Finally , the paper summarizes and induces the full text , and probes into the further research direction .

【学位授予单位】：南京工业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F274;F426.82

【参考文献】