合作环境及Shapley讨价还价下的供应链质量双边谈判

发布时间：2018-04-05 11:03

本文选题：质量　切入点：双边谈判　出处：《系统管理学报》2014年02期

【摘要】：针对来料缺陷,基于合作博弈及Shapley讨价还价理论,探讨了供应链质量双边谈判问题。首先,探讨了非合作博弈的情形,并进一步探讨了矩阵博弈框架及合作环境下的质量最优合同设计。给出了供应链质量双边谈判的Shapley讨价还价解及解的内涵、特征结构及价值。合作环境下的质量双边谈判Pareto最优解与分销商检验策略无关,但与谈判现状点的选取有关。供应商的谈判价值与分销商检验水平正相关,与其所分担的外部故障成本比例反相关。分销商的谈判价值随其检验水平先提高后降低,与供应商承担外部故障成本比例正相关。Shapley讨价还价谈判结果对供销双方均有利,供应商将获得最小的谈判结果,而分销商将获得最大的谈判结果。最后,通过数值分析,验证了上述研究结果。
[Abstract]:Based on the theory of cooperative game and Shapley bargaining, the bilateral negotiation of supply chain quality is discussed.Firstly, the non-cooperative game is discussed, and the framework of matrix game and the quality optimal contract design in cooperative environment are discussed.The connotation, characteristic structure and value of Shapley bargaining solution for bilateral negotiation of supply chain quality are given.The Pareto optimal solution of quality bilateral negotiation in cooperative environment has nothing to do with the distributor inspection strategy, but it is related to the selection of negotiation status point.The supplier's negotiation value is positively correlated with the distributor's inspection level, and is inversely related to its share of the external failure cost.The negotiation value of the distributor increases first with its inspection level and then decreases. The bargaining result is beneficial to both suppliers and sellers, and the supplier will obtain the minimum negotiation result.The distributor will get the most out of the negotiations.Finally, the above results are verified by numerical analysis.
【作者单位】：西安交通大学管理学院;机械制造系统工程国家重点实验室;过程控制与效率工程教育部重点实验室;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70872091) 高等学校博士点专项基金资助项目(20090201110031)
【分类号】：F274;F224.32

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