零售商资金约束下的供应链回购契约模型研究

发布时间：2018-04-08 10:29

本文选题：回购契约参数　切入点：资金约束　出处：《海南大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：随着全球合作的深入开展,联系着各厂商的供应链这一概念开始出现在人们的视野中,供应链中的企业需要更有效地协作,达成供应链利润最大化。在零售商面临资金约束和市场风险时,制造商可以通过回购契约帮助零售商向银行贷款以及分担市场风险。回购契约参数能否合理准确地设计,直接影响到供应链中企业的利润。本文的模型研究的是由单一制造商及单一零售商组成的二级供应链的回购契约参数设计问题。其中制造商是Stackelberg博弈的领导者,在营运周期起始时设计契约参数并向零售商提供回购契约;零售商根据制造商给出的契约参数选择是否参与博弈,如果选择参与则确定相应的订货量,但不具有设计参数的能力。本文假设制造商与零售商均为风险中性,制造商资金充足,零售商存在资金约束,当零售商的自有现金不足以支付所需订货量对应货款时,选择向银行贷款。营运周期起始时,制造商根据零售商的自有现金水平,提出回购价与批发价,零售商决定订购量及是否需要贷款,营运周期末制造商回购所有滞销商品,零售商偿还银行贷款。本文通过数学模型分析,主要研究了制造商公布批发价及回购价后,零售商在不同自有现金水平下的最优订购决策的问题;以及制造商根据零售商的订购决策设计回购契约参数的方法;得到了不同决策情形下零售商订购量应满足的适用区间。在零售商资金充足、零售商资金短缺且无贷款风险这两种情形下,达成了回购契约下的供应链协调。本文通过数值算例分析,发现回购契约既适用于资金充足的条件,也适用于零售商资金短缺的情况。通过对系统参数的灵敏度分析,整理出系统参数的变化对零售商订货量适用区间的影响,并发现回购契约不适用于所有市场环境。
[Abstract]:With the further development of global cooperation, the concept of supply chain, which is related to various manufacturers, has begun to appear in the eyes of people. Enterprises in the supply chain need to cooperate more effectively to maximize the profit of supply chain.When retailers face financial constraints and market risks, manufacturers can use repo contracts to help retailers borrow from banks and share market risks.Whether the parameters of repurchase contract can be reasonably and accurately designed will directly affect the profit of the enterprise in the supply chain.The model of this paper deals with the repurchase contract parameter design of a two-stage supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer.The manufacturer is the leader of the Stackelberg game, designs the contract parameters at the beginning of the operating cycle and provides the retailer with the repo contract. The retailer chooses whether to participate in the game according to the contract parameters given by the manufacturer.If selected to participate, determine the corresponding order, but do not have the ability to design parameters.This paper assumes that both manufacturers and retailers are risk-neutral, manufacturers have sufficient funds, retailers have financial constraints, when the retailer's own cash is not enough to pay the required order quantity corresponding to the loan, choose to loan to the bank.At the beginning of the operating cycle, the manufacturer puts forward the repo price and wholesale price according to the retailer's own cash level, the retailer decides the order quantity and whether the loan is needed, the manufacturer repurchases all the unsalable goods at the end of the operating cycle, and the retailer pays back the bank loan.Through mathematical model analysis, this paper mainly studies the optimal ordering decision of retailers under different cash levels after the manufacturer publishes wholesale price and repo price.The method of designing repurchase contract parameters according to the retailer's order decision is presented, and the applicable interval of retailer's order quantity is obtained under different decision cases.The supply chain coordination under the repurchase contract is achieved under the two situations of the retailer's sufficient capital, the retailer's shortage of funds and the lack of loan risk.In this paper, a numerical example shows that the repurchase contract is not only suitable for the condition of capital adequacy, but also suitable for the shortage of retailer funds.Based on the sensitivity analysis of system parameters, the influence of system parameters on the applicable range of retailers' order volume is sorted out, and it is found that the repurchase contract is not suitable for all market environments.
【学位授予单位】：海南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F274

【参考文献】