博弈论原理下的供应链担保模型研究

发布时间：2018-04-10 22:26

本文选题：定价 + 担保　；参考：《北京交通大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：本文,我们主要从产品定价、担保维修策略、信息水平以及博弈论的角度,构建数学模型。在前一部分中,我们建立了两个子模型,一个是含有生产商和顾客的两阶供应链模型,另一个是含有生产商、零售商和顾客的三阶供应链模型。其中,由生产商或者零售商来给顾客提供担保服务,该担保服务需要顾客付一定的费用。在担保期内,由担保的提供者进行周期性的预防性维修和小修,来保证设备的正常运行。生产商和零售商之间是Stackelberg博弈的关系。以获得生产商和零售商的最大收益为目的,我们找到了最优的零售价格、担保价格和预防性维修次数。最后,我们探讨了这三个变量和关键参数的关系,并且通过数值例,对比了两个模型的收益。在后一部分中,我们建立了一个含有一个生产商和两个零售商的供应链模型。这里生产商在决策批发价时有两种方案:要么不考虑价格差异,对零售商定相同的批发价;要么考虑价格差异,对零售商定不同的批发价。生产商和零售商之间是Stackelberg博弈的关系。一方面,我们探讨了两个零售商决策完全相同的情况,即都选择合作的情况,优化批发价和担保时长,从而找到双方最优的收益,最后通过数值例与都选择竞争的情况进行比较。另一方面,我们探讨了一方零售商对另一方决策完全不清楚的情况下,两个零售商的均衡策略。我们发现无论生产商选择哪一种定价策略,两个零售商的均衡策略均是(不合作,不合作)。
[Abstract]:In this paper, we construct a mathematical model from the point of view of product pricing, warranty maintenance strategy, information level and game theory.In the former part, we establish two sub-models, one is the two-order supply chain model with manufacturer and customer, the other is the third-order supply chain model with producer, retailer and customer.Among them, the manufacturer or retailer provides the guarantee service to the customer, which requires the customer to pay a certain fee.During the warranty period, periodic preventive maintenance and minor repairs are carried out by the sponsor to ensure the normal operation of the equipment.The relationship between manufacturer and retailer is Stackelberg game.In order to maximize the profits of producers and retailers, we have found the optimal retail price, guaranteed price and the number of preventive maintenance.Finally, we discuss the relationship between the three variables and the key parameters, and compare the benefits of the two models by numerical examples.In the latter part, we establish a supply chain model with one manufacturer and two retailers.There are two ways for manufacturers to make wholesale price decisions: one is to set the same wholesale price for retailers regardless of the price difference, or the other is to set different wholesale prices for retailers, taking into account price differences.The relationship between manufacturer and retailer is Stackelberg game.On the one hand, we explored the exact same situation in which two retailers made the same decision, that is, they both chose to cooperate, optimize the wholesale price and the duration of the guarantee, so as to find the best return for both parties.Finally, a numerical example is given to compare the results of both selection and competition.On the other hand, we discuss the equilibrium strategy of one retailer when the other side's decision is completely unclear.We find that no matter what kind of pricing strategy the manufacturer chooses, the equilibrium strategy of the two retailers is (uncooperative, uncooperative).
【学位授予单位】：北京交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F274;F224.32

【参考文献】