成本信息不对称和产能信息不对称下供应链协调研究

发布时间：2018-04-11 04:04

本文选题：信息不对称 + 供应链协调　；参考：《华中科技大学》2014年博士论文

【摘要】：企业在追求自身收益最大化时常与供应链整体收益最大化的目标相冲突,拥有信息优势的供应链成员总是想获取更多的收益,从而隐藏与自己决策有关的私有信息,导致了供应链中信息不对称现象的产生。在现实的生产经营环境中,成本信息是供应链中最容易产生不对称信息的区域之一,成本信息意味着企业的技术经济指标水平,企业往往将成本信息作为商业秘密严格保密。另外,随着制造业竞争的加剧,生产企业通常将产能视为自己的有效竞争手段之一,不会将产能信息轻易透露给外界。本文研究了成本信息不对称下,如何基于委托代理理论设计契约,揭露真实成本信息的同时减小信息租金的付出,使得供应链整体效益得到提高,实现供应链协调。此外,本文研究了装配系统中,多供应商产能信息不对称下,如何结合安全多方计算,设计安全的产能信息共享机制,实现多供应商供货协同。据此,论文主要开展了下述几个方面的研究工作：首先研究了零售商占主导地位的供应链中,生产成本信息不对称下供应链协调问题。分析了生产成本信息不对称下,信息租金对供应链非效率的影响。基于基础的信息甄别模型,设计了基于收益共享和价格补贴的联合契约,其中收益共享比例和价格补贴满足完全信息下供应协调时的关系,通过激励相容原理,在揭示真实的生产成本信息时,实现供应链协调。其次探讨了促销努力成本信息不对称下,如何设计契约鼓励销售商加大促销投入,减少信息不对称带来的非效率影响。在促销努力成本信息不对称下,基于委托代理理论和信息甄别模型。设计了一个回购契约揭示真实促销努力成本信息,由于信息不对称和促销激励不足,回购契约下供应链非效率损耗较高。在回购契约上引入成本共担和转移支付形成新的联合契约,可削弱信息不对称和促销激励不足的双重影响,从而提高销售商的促销努力水平。通过对契约的参数设置,发现一定条件下联合契约能实现信息不对称下的供应链协调。然后研究了信息预测成本不对称下供应链协调问题。将信息预测成本作为供应链运营成本考虑到供应链中,并假设零售商是风险规避的,通过分析发现零售商为了得到充足的货源,有动机谎报信息预测成本。本文进一步分析了信息预测成本不对称对供应链效率的影响,设计了一个由回购契约和支付方案组成的联合契约。支付方案使得零售商必须为谎报信息预测成本产生的需求估计偏差支付一定费用,理性的零售商会选择显示真实的信息预测成本,同时回购契约可消除风险规避的影响,实现供应链协调。最后研究了私有信息保护下多供应商供货协同问题。引入安全多方保密排序方案,设计了一个安全的信息共享机制,使得供应链各供应商在不泄露任何产能信息的情况下的决策与完全信息下最优决策一致。为了吸引各供应商参与信息共享,提出了一个基于讨价还价的补偿机制,根据每个参与方的议价能力将信息共享得到的额外利润进行分配,确保各参与方通过信息共享提高收益。
[Abstract]:Enterprises in the pursuit of their own benefit maximization and often the whole supply chain profit maximization goal conflict, have information advantage in the supply chain members always want to get more revenue, and hidden about making their own private information thus leads to information asymmetry phenomenon in the supply chain. In the real production environment. Cost information is one of the most easily produce asymmetric information in regional supply chain, cost information means that the enterprise level of technical and economic indicators, enterprises tend to cost information as business secret strictly confidential. In addition, with the manufacturing industry competition, enterprises will usually be regarded as one of the effective means of competition capacity of their own, not the capacity of information easily revealed to the outside world. This paper studies the cost under asymmetric information, how to design the contract based on the principal-agent theory, revealing the true cost information at the same time reduction Small information rent to pay, the overall benefit of the supply chain to improve supply chain coordination. In addition, this paper studies the assembly system, multi supplier capacity under asymmetric information, how to combine the secure multi-party computation, the safety design of the capacity of the information sharing mechanism, to achieve multi supplier collaboration. Accordingly, the paper carried out the following research work several aspects of the:
Firstly, the retailer dominated supply chain, supply chain coordination problems under asymmetric information of product costs. The production cost analysis of asymmetric information, the information rent of supply chain non efficiency. The influence of information screening model based on the combined contract revenue sharing and price subsidies based on the revenue sharing ratio and the price subsidy to meet relationship under complete information supply coordination, the incentive compatibility principle, the production cost of the information revealing the truth, to achieve supply chain coordination.
Then discusses the promotional cost under asymmetric information, how to design a contract to encourage vendors to increase promotional investment, reduce the impact of non efficiency caused by asymmetric information. The asymmetry in the promotional effort cost information, principal-agent theory and information screening model. Based on the design of a buyback contract reveal the true sales effort cost information, due to lack of information asymmetry and promotion incentive, non high efficiency loss buyback contract of supply chain. The introduction of cost sharing and transfer payment form a joint contract in the new buyback contract, double effect can weaken the information asymmetry and promotion incentive, so as to improve the retailer's promotional effort level. Through the parameters of the contract set, found the combined contract under certain conditions can be achieved supply chain coordination under asymmetric information.
And then study the information asymmetry cost prediction of supply chain coordination. The information cost projections as supply chain operations to take into account the cost of the supply chain, and assuming that the retailer is risk averse, through the analysis found that retailers in order to get adequate supply, motivation and interest lie cost projections. This paper further analyzes the influence of information asymmetry on the cost forecast the efficiency of the supply chain, the design consists of a buyback contract and payment scheme combined contract payment scheme. Retailers must produce false information to predict the cost needs to pay a cost estimation bias, rational choice that predicted the retailer cost real information, at the same time, the buyback contract can eliminate the influence of risk aversion and supply chain coordination.
At the end of the multi vendor private information under the protection of supply coordination problem. The introduction of safety secure multi-party ranking scheme, design a secure information sharing mechanism, which makes the supplier supply chain did not divulge any information in the production decision under complete information and the optimal decision. In order to attract suppliers to participate in information sharing, put forward a compensation mechanism based on bargaining, according to each participant's bargaining power will get extra profit sharing information distribution, to ensure that the party involved in improving revenue through information sharing.

【学位授予单位】：华中科技大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F274

【参考文献】