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供应链金融契约优化设计研究

发布时间:2018-04-12 18:35

  本文选题:供应链金融 + 委托代理理论 ; 参考:《西安建筑科技大学》2014年硕士论文


【摘要】:近年来,我国经济处于迅速发展阶段,产业链升级给中小企业带来了发展机遇。然而中小企业普遍存在经营规模较小,抗风险能力弱、自有资本少等特点,造成了融资难的困境。供应链金融的出现在中小企业融资方面发挥着重要的作用。作为一种新型的金融创新产品,,供应链金融不仅能在一定程度上缓解中小企业融资难的困境,还能优化商业银行的业务结构,降低融资风险,同时也给核心企业和第三方物流企业带来了新的利润增长点,实现了多方共赢。但是由于供应链金融业务发展还不成熟,加上中小企业良莠不齐,出现了很多违约现象。本文基于这一切入点,以供应链金融服务契约的稳定性和有效性为目标,意在构建一个合理的契约优化机制,推进供应链金融更好的发展。 首先,对供应链金融服务、信贷契约和利益分配等方面的国内外研究现状以及相关理论进行归纳总结,分析供应链金融的内涵、主体关系、运作模式以及供应链金融在国内的发展现状,指出当前供应链金融服务契约的问题所在。基于委托代理理论,从利益的分配原则、分配要素和分配方式三个方面阐明了供应链金融服务契约优化设计的思路,给出了供应链金融契约的优化路径。 其次,对供应链金融利益分配进行优化研究。阐述了合作博弈中Shapley值法的优缺点,尝试运用Shapley值法对供应链金融产出的经济利益进行合理的分配。然后综合考虑风险因素、投入资金和努力程度对Shapley值进行修正,得到改进后的Shapley值模型。通过算例分析验证供应链金融服务利益分配优化模型的合理性和可行性,对利益分配的结果进行比较,得出考虑修正因子改进后的Shapley值更能体现公平合理的利益分配原则。 最后,对本文研究的内容进行了总结和展望。给出了从构建合作伙伴关系、建立合理的供应链金融契约激励机制、加快金融体制改革和组织制度创新、引入保险机制等方面改进和完善的建议。
[Abstract]:In recent years, the economy of our country is in the rapid development stage, the upgrading of industrial chain brings the development opportunity to the small and medium-sized enterprises.However, SMEs generally have the characteristics of small scale, weak ability to resist risks and less own capital, which results in the difficulty of financing.The appearance of supply chain finance plays an important role in the financing of small and medium enterprises.As a new kind of financial innovation product, supply chain finance can not only alleviate the difficulty of financing for small and medium-sized enterprises to some extent, but also optimize the business structure of commercial banks and reduce the financing risk.At the same time, it also brings new profit growth point to core enterprises and third party logistics enterprises.However, supply chain financial business development is not mature, plus small and medium-sized enterprises intermingled, there are a lot of default phenomenon.Based on this breakthrough point, this paper aims at establishing a reasonable contract optimization mechanism to promote the better development of supply chain finance, aiming at the stability and effectiveness of supply chain financial service contract.First of all, the domestic and foreign research status and related theories of supply chain financial services, credit contract and benefit distribution are summarized, and the connotation and main body relationship of supply chain finance are analyzed.The operation mode and the current situation of supply chain finance in China are pointed out, and the problems of supply chain financial service contract are pointed out.Based on the principal-agent theory, this paper expounds the idea of optimal design of supply chain financial service contract from three aspects of benefit distribution principle, distribution elements and distribution mode, and gives the optimized path of supply chain financial contract.Secondly, optimize the distribution of financial benefits in supply chain.This paper expounds the advantages and disadvantages of the Shapley value method in cooperative game, and tries to use the Shapley value method to reasonably distribute the economic benefits of the financial output of the supply chain.Then, considering the risk factors, the Shapley value is modified by investment and effort, and the improved Shapley value model is obtained.This paper verifies the rationality and feasibility of the profit distribution optimization model of supply chain financial services by example, compares the results of interest distribution, and draws the conclusion that the Shapley value after considering the modified factor can better reflect the principle of fair and reasonable benefit distribution.Finally, the content of this paper is summarized and prospected.Some suggestions on how to improve and improve the mechanism of financial contract in supply chain, such as establishing partnership, setting up reasonable incentive mechanism of financial contract, speeding up the reform of financial system and the innovation of organizational system, introducing insurance mechanism, are put forward.
【学位授予单位】:西安建筑科技大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2014
【分类号】:F274;F832

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