信息不对称下供应链质量管理合同设计研究

发布时间：2018-04-25 22:21

本文选题：供应链管理 + 信息不对称　；参考：《华南理工大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：信息问题和契约问题常见于许多发展中国家的产业价值链，在阿塞拜疆也是如此。苏联解体导致了政治混乱。尽管阿塞拜疆的经济增长速度等一些经济指标在独联体国家中居于领先地位，但实际上工农业产值还未达到独立前水平，经济发展中还存在一系列问题。经济瘫痪以及包括阿塞拜疆在内的苏联加盟共和国的社会体制崩溃。为了建立创新型经济，科学和制造业之间的关系将得到加强，根据市场需求进行的科学研究等必要程序将落实到位。然而，当信息和契约问题同时存在，像引进新技术和提供延伸服务这些传统干预措施可能无法让供应商和制造商从他们的产品中获取更高收益。这些问题会阻止买家和卖家进入市场，打破买卖双方之间的信任，并迫使市场参与者花更多时间来检验产品质量和贸易商的信誉，从而削弱价值链的所有参与者的盈利能力，最终导致市场效率低下。美国的决策者以及阿塞拜疆的研究机构多年来一直从事以完善市场协调能力和提高收入为目标的工作来发展阿塞拜疆的工业。研究表明，信息问题和契约问题是所有供应商即使在采取前期发展措施以后，，仍然很难进入新的市场和接触新的买家的关键原因。基于上述调查结果，我们需要着重强调的是，要实现优先发展的目标和确保经济可持续发展，就必须特别注意供货契约的研究，建立相关机制来解决包括刺激订单，纠正阿塞拜疆市场的不正当竞争，保护本地市场在内的信息问题。这篇论文的目的是为在提供项目的质量信息不对称的条件下，设计一个能使买方预期收益最大化并促使供应商改善所提供的产品质量的最优合同提供一个范本。这篇论文的目的是为在提供项目的质量信息不对称的条件下，设计一个能使买方预期收益最大化并促使供应商改善所提供的产品质量的最优合同提供一个范本。同时也为双方参与者避免机会主义行为设计了激励合同的方案。利用最优控制理论和委托代理理论分析和描述主营商和代理商对质量的决议，研究信息不对称对玩家的影响结果表明，因信息不对称遭殃的不仅仅是消费者，隐藏的特别卖家也可能会损害供应商的利润。调整制造商的失误控制水平和惩罚比例来刺激供应商提高质量水准是解决这些问题的最佳方法。我们希望结果将辅助呈现这次研究，并且有助于进一步探索阿塞拜疆市场的信息和契约问题。
[Abstract]:The problem of information and contract is common in the industrial value chain of many developing countries, which is also the case in Azerbaijan. The disintegration of the Soviet Union has led to political confusion. Although some economic indicators, such as the speed of economic growth in Azerbaijan, are in the leading position in the CIS countries, the output value of industrial and agricultural production has not yet reached the level of pre independence. There is still a series of problems in the development. The economic paralysis and the collapse of the social system of the Soviet Republic, including Azerbaijan, will strengthen the relationship between science and manufacturing in order to build an innovative economy, and the necessary process of scientific research based on market demand will be put in place.
However, as information and contract problems exist simultaneously, traditional interventions such as introducing new technologies and providing extended services may not allow suppliers and manufacturers to gain higher returns from their products. These issues prevent buyers and sellers from entering the market, breaking the trust between buyers and sellers, and forcing market participants to spend more Time examines product quality and reputation of traders, thereby weakening the profitability of all participants in the value chain, resulting in low market efficiency.
American policymakers and Azerbaijan's research institutions have been working on the development of Azerbaijan's industry for years to improve their market coordination and income. Research shows that information and contract issues are difficult for all suppliers to enter new markets and to access new markets even after their early development measures. The key to a new buyer.
Based on the above findings, we need to emphasize that, in order to achieve the goal of priority development and to ensure sustainable economic development, we must pay special attention to the research of supply contracts and establish relevant mechanisms to solve the problems of information issues including the irritation of orders, the correction of the unfair competition in the Azerbaijan market and the protection of the local market.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a model for the design of an optimal contract that maximizes the expected profit of the buyer and promotes the quality of the products provided by the supplier in the condition of the asymmetric quality information of the project.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a model for the design of an optimal contract that can maximize the expected profit of the buyer and promote the quality of the products provided by the supplier in the condition of providing the quality information of the project, and also designed the incentive contract for the participants to avoid opportunism. The optimal control theory and principal-agent theory analyze and describe the resolution of the quality of the main business and agent. The results of the impact of information asymmetry on players show that the information asymmetry is not only the consumer, but the hidden special seller may also damage the supplier's profit. An example is the best way to stimulate the quality of the supplier to solve these problems. We hope that the results will assist in the presentation of this study and help further explore the information and contract issues in the Azerbaijan market.

【学位授予单位】：华南理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F273.2;F274;F436.8

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