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基于非对称信息及契约的供应链竞争研究

发布时间:2018-05-06 06:17

  本文选题:供应链契约 + 非对称信息 ; 参考:《北京邮电大学》2017年硕士论文


【摘要】:伴随着科学技术的快速发展,在全球经济日趋一体化的背景下,企业在市场经济中要想取得成功,不仅要关注自身结构和效益,更要关注竞争对手的动向,时刻做好竞争应对之策是很重要的。现实生活中,各个企业为了能够在竞争中获得有利位置,隐瞒一些自己的信息,以此获得更多收益,但这样不仅不能有效的增加自身利润,反而会损害供应链整体效益,因此信息共享是供应链研究的重要课题,而解决信息非对称的一个有效方法就是供应链契约,因此我们在非对称信息及契约的条件下研究供应链竞争是非常有意义的。本文在传统供应链一对一的结构上进行拓展,研究两个供应商和一个制造商的供应链,针对制造商加工成本信息与制造商需求信息的对称与否问题,采用不同的契约即利润共享契约和两部收费法契约,研究供应链竞争问题,在研究过程中,综合博弈论、供应链契约及运筹学等相关知识,建立模型并进行求解。首先,本文通过对国内外已有研究成果的学习,总结供应链竞争、非对称信息的现有研究状况,供应链契约在供应链管理中的应用现状与其原理。其次,本文在利润共享契约下,分析了第二个供应商是否加入竞争的情况,在有两个供应商竞争与制造商交易时,又分别讨论了制造商与两个供应商均信息对称、制造商与其中一个供应商信息对称与另一个信息非对称、制造商与两个供应商均信息非对称四种情况下的最优决策问题;再次,在两部收费法契约下讨论了制造商与两个供应商信息对称与否情况下的最优决策。最后,通过选取合适的数值,使用MATLAB建模软件进行数值分析,验证了结论的正确性。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of science and technology, in the context of the increasingly integrated global economy, if enterprises want to achieve success in the market economy, they should not only pay attention to their own structure and efficiency, but also pay attention to the trends of their competitors. It is important to make a competitive response at all times. In real life, in order to get a favorable position in the competition and conceal some information, each enterprise can gain more income, but not only can not effectively increase its own profits, but will damage the overall efficiency of the supply chain. Therefore, information sharing is an important subject in supply chain research, and an effective method to solve information asymmetry is supply chain contract. Therefore, it is very meaningful for us to study supply chain competition under the condition of asymmetric information and contract. This paper extends the one-to-one structure of traditional supply chain, and studies the supply chain of two suppliers and one manufacturer, aiming at the problem of whether the manufacturer's processing cost information and the manufacturer's demand information are symmetrical or not. Different contracts, namely profit sharing contracts and two charging contracts, are adopted to study the competition of supply chain. In the process of research, the relevant knowledge such as game theory, supply chain contract and operational research are synthesized, and the model is established and solved. First of all, this paper summarizes the current research status of supply chain competition, asymmetric information, the application of supply chain contract in supply chain management and its principle through the study of existing research results at home and abroad. Secondly, under the profit-sharing contract, this paper analyzes whether the second supplier joins the competition. When there are two suppliers competing with the manufacturer, we discuss the symmetry of information between the manufacturer and the two suppliers. The optimal decision problem of the manufacturer and one of the suppliers is asymmetric with the other information asymmetric, the manufacturer and two suppliers are asymmetric information in four cases. In this paper, we discuss the optimal decision in the case of symmetric information between manufacturer and two suppliers under the contract of two charging methods. Finally, the correctness of the conclusion is verified by selecting appropriate numerical value and using MATLAB modeling software to carry out numerical analysis.
【学位授予单位】:北京邮电大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2017
【分类号】:F274

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