考虑利他偏好的低碳供应链批发价格契约协调研究

发布时间：2018-05-12 08:27

本文选题：批发价格契约 + 利他偏好　；参考：《重庆理工大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：全球气候变暖引发了以“低能耗、低污染、低排放”为发展理念的低碳经济,这对仅以追求经济效益为主要任务的传统供应链提出了挑战。近几年,基于碳减排的供应链管理研究逐步成为研究热点,这对提高供应链的竞争力以及实现社会经济效益和环境效益的“双赢”都有积极作用。在此背景下,在对低碳供应链协调、消费者低碳偏好、利他偏好以及利他偏好对供应链相关决策及协调性影响等问题进行相关研究后,建立了相应的博弈模型并得出得相关结论,延拓了低碳供应链契约协调的理论,使模型更准确地描述现实,亦有利于批发价格契约协调供应链的应用,并更科学地指导低碳供应链管理实践。论文的主要工作和重要结论如下:(1)利他偏好下的低碳供应链批发价格契约决策模型。探讨了利他偏好对低碳供应链相关决策及其协调性的影响,研究发现,零售商更倾向于与低碳型制造商合作,零售商的利他偏好能在一定程度上鼓励制造商投资减排,因而制造商更倾向于与利他偏好型零售商合作。在制造商面临碳减排压力下,零售商更应承担起整个供应链的效用责任,除了考虑自身效用外,还需考虑制造商的效用,其利他性应高于制造商,进而推动供应链系统效用的提升。但在批发价格契约下,无论零售商和制造商是否具有利他偏好行为,均不能改变传统供应链的协调性,即不能实现供应链的协调。(2)消费者低碳偏好下考虑利他偏好的低碳供应链批发价格契约协调研究。探讨了在消费者低碳偏好下,决策主体的利他偏好对低碳供应链决策及其协调性的影响,研究发现,消费者低碳偏好能促进制造商和零售商的利他合作,并能鼓励制造商投资减排以实现真正的“低碳”;在消费者低碳偏好下,零售商的利他偏好能在一定程度上鼓励制造商投资减排,提升企业的社会形象,从而提高产品销售量,以实现双方收益的增加。因此,在低碳背景下,更应该激励零售商的利他偏好行为,从而更大程度地提高碳减排率。(3)利他偏好信息非对称下的低碳供应链批发价格契约协调研究。在利他偏好信息非对称下,按零售商利他偏好信息完备程度与理性程度将零售商和制造商的博弈分为五阶段,研究了零售商利他偏好行为对低碳供应链决策的影响,研究发现,在博弈第四阶段当零售商利他偏好信息与制造商识别的利他信息相等时即当信息完备时,碳减排率达到最大值,制造商利润和供应链利润也达到最大值且大于传统供应链,而这时零售商的利润却降到最低;当零售商伪装自身利他偏好信息时,制造商和供应链的利润降到最低且低于传统供应链,零售商的利润提高,但仍小于博弈第一阶段即传统自利型供应链。
[Abstract]:Global warming has led to a low-carbon economy with the concept of "low energy consumption, low pollution and low emission", which challenges the traditional supply chain, whose main task is to pursue economic benefits. In recent years, the research on supply chain management based on carbon emission reduction has gradually become a research hotspot, which has a positive effect on improving the competitiveness of supply chain and realizing the "win-win" of social and economic benefits and environmental benefits. In this context, after the research on low carbon supply chain coordination, consumer low carbon preference, altruistic preference and altruistic preference on supply chain related decisions and coordination issues, This paper establishes the corresponding game model and draws the relevant conclusions, extends the theory of low-carbon supply chain contract coordination, makes the model describe the reality more accurately, and is also advantageous to the wholesale price contract coordination supply chain application. And more scientific guidance of low-carbon supply chain management practice. The main work and important conclusions are as follows: 1) A low carbon supply chain Wholesale Price contract decision Model with altruistic preference. This paper discusses the influence of altruistic preference on the decision and coordination of low-carbon supply chain. It is found that retailers are more inclined to cooperate with low-carbon manufacturers, and that the altruistic preference of retailers can encourage manufacturers to invest in emission reduction to a certain extent. As a result, manufacturers tend to work with altruistic retailers. When manufacturers are under pressure to reduce carbon emissions, retailers should assume the utility responsibility of the whole supply chain. Besides considering their own utility, they should also consider the utility of the manufacturer, whose altruism should be higher than that of the manufacturer. Furthermore, the utility of supply chain system is promoted. However, under the wholesale price contract, whether retailers and manufacturers have altruistic behavior or not, it can not change the coordination of traditional supply chain. That is, the coordination of wholesale price contracts in low carbon supply chain considering altruism under low carbon preference can not be realized. This paper discusses the influence of altruistic preference of decision makers on low-carbon supply chain decision making and its coordination under low carbon consumers' preference. It is found that consumers' low carbon preference can promote altruistic cooperation between manufacturers and retailers. And it can encourage manufacturers to invest in emission reduction to achieve a true "low carbon"; under the low carbon preference of consumers, retailers' altruistic preference can to some extent encourage manufacturers to invest in emission reduction, enhance the social image of enterprises, and thus increase product sales. In order to achieve both sides of the increase in revenue. Therefore, in the context of low carbon, it is necessary to encourage retailers' altruistic behavior, so as to improve the carbon abatement rate to a greater extent) the coordination study of wholesale price contract of low carbon supply chain under asymmetric preference information of altruism. Under asymmetric altruistic preference information, the game between retailer and manufacturer is divided into five stages according to the completeness and rationality of retailer's altruistic information. The influence of retailer's altruistic behavior on low-carbon supply chain decision is studied. In the fourth stage of the game, when the retailer's altruistic preference information is equal to the altruistic information identified by the manufacturer, that is, when the information is complete, the carbon abatement rate reaches the maximum, and the manufacturer's profit and the supply chain profit also reach the maximum and are larger than the traditional supply chain. When retailers disguise their altruistic preferences, the profits of manufacturers and supply chains are minimized and lower than those of traditional supply chains. However, it is still smaller than the first stage of the game, that is, the traditional self-profit supply chain.
【学位授予单位】：重庆理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F274

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