基于激励理论的政府与逆向供应链系统协调机制

发布时间：2018-05-14 02:15

本文选题：逆向供应链 + 道德风险　；参考：《系统工程学报》2015年06期

【摘要】：针对一个道德风险和逆向选择并存的逆向供应链系统,利用博弈论和激励理论,分别研究了对称信息和不对称信息下政府和制造商线性契约设计过程,分析了各激励因素对契约的影响,并通过数值仿真探讨了各参数变化对政府、制造商和回收商期望收益的影响.研究表明:委托方设计合理的激励契约能有效甄别代理方的信息,促进企业努力水平,提高政府和企业的期望收益.
[Abstract]:In view of a reverse supply chain system, which coexists between moral hazard and adverse selection, the design process of linear contract between government and manufacturer under symmetric information and asymmetric information is studied with game theory and incentive theory. The influence of various incentive factors on the contract is analyzed, and the changes of each parameter to the government and the manufacturer are discussed by the numerical value simulation. The research shows that a reasonable incentive contract designed by the client can effectively identify the information of the agent, promote the level of enterprise effort, and improve the expected income of the government and the enterprise.

【作者单位】：浙江工业大学经贸管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71172182;71371169) 国家留学基金资助项目(201208330004) 浙江省自然科学基金资助项目(LY14G020005) 浙江省哲学社会科学规划课题资助项目(14NDJC167YB)
【分类号】：F274

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