考虑违约风险时收益共享-贸易信贷契约下多个竞争零售商的供应链协调

发布时间：2018-05-17 00:16

本文选题：供应链协调 + 违约风险　；参考：《运筹与管理》2017年04期

【摘要】：在供应商向多个零售商提供贸易信贷的环境下,本文考虑了零售商存在违约风险和他们之间存在竞争时的供应链协调问题。研究表明,在比例分配市场需求下,多个竞争的零售商之间存在唯一的纳什均衡订购量,以及零售商违约风险的提高和他们之间竞争增强都会增加均衡订购量。当零售商之间的竞争较弱时,贸易信贷将无法协调供应链。为此,本文使用了收益分享与贸易信贷相结合的机制以协调供应链,且分析了零售商的违约风险和他们之间的竞争对协调契约参数的影响。当零售商的竞争强度一定时,批发价和风险溢价都随着零售商违约风险的提高而增大,而收益分享比例随着违约风险的提高而减小;当零售商的违约风险一定时,批发价和风险溢价都随着零售商之间竞争强度的提高而增大,而收益分享比例随着竞争强度的增强而减小。进一步的研究发现,零售商的违约风险越高以及他们之间竞争越激烈对零售商越不利,而对供应商越有利。最后,结合数值实验验证了收益共享-贸易信贷契约的有效性。
[Abstract]:In the context of suppliers providing trade credit to multiple retailers, this paper considers the supply chain coordination problem when retailers have default risk and competition among them. The research shows that under the demand of proportional distribution market, there is a unique Nash equilibrium order quantity among multiple competing retailers, and the increase of retailer default risk and competition between them will increase the equilibrium order quantity. When competition between retailers is weak, trade credit will not be able to coordinate the supply chain. Therefore, this paper uses the mechanism of revenue sharing and trade credit to coordinate the supply chain, and analyzes the default risk of retailers and the influence of competition between them on the coordination contract parameters. When the competition intensity of the retailer is constant, the wholesale price and risk premium increase with the increase of the retailer's default risk, while the proportion of profit sharing decreases with the increase of the default risk, and when the retailer's default risk is fixed, Both wholesale price and risk premium increase with the increase of competition intensity among retailers, while the proportion of revenue-sharing decreases with the increase of competition intensity. Further research found that the higher the retailer's default risk and the more competitive they are, the more unfavorable it is for the retailer and the better for the supplier. Finally, the effectiveness of the profit-sharing-trade credit contract is verified by numerical experiments.
【作者单位】：浙江大学管理学院;大连理工大学系统工程研究所;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金(71671023,71171027,71431002);国家自然科学基金创新研究群体基金(71421001) 中央高校基本科研业务经费(DUT15YQ102)的支持
【分类号】：F713.32

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