总承包商视角的国际工程项目质量控制研究

发布时间：2018-05-20 09:56

本文选题：质量控制 + 国际工程项目　；参考：《西南交通大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：中国企业近年来发展迅速,逐步调整发展战略,以EPC总承包模式积极参与到国际工程项目当中。同时随着企业资金实力的增长,各国政府财政吃紧,PPP+EPC模式也逐步得到政府和企业的青睐。但不论哪一种模式,工程项目均由总承包商和诸多分包商共同完成,双方均对项目质量负责,所以总承包商需要加强对自身的质量控制和分包商的质量控制,从而保障国际工程项目的工程质量。基于此,本文首先总结分析了供应链质量控制方面的国内外研究现状,给出了本文将要研究的内容,即考虑分包商综合能力以及双方谈判能力的情况下,构建博弈模型并分析双方的质量行为等问题。同时也对委托代理、纳什谈判等理论进行了简述,为后续研究做铺垫。其次,论文结合实际情况对EPC模式下总承包商和分包商的质量职责和行为进行了梳理。同时在总承包商和分包商共担业主惩罚的机制下,基于委托代理理论构建了国内EPC合作项目的质量控制模型。研究发现分包商最优质量努力程度随着其承担业主惩罚的比例增大而增大,但存在最优分担比例使总承包商收益最大。另外在总承包商承担业主惩罚的机制下,基于委托代理理论和纳什谈判理论分别构建了分包商不具有谈判能力和具有一定谈判能力的质量控制模型。研究发现分包商的综合能力越强,其最优质量努力程度越高;总承包商存在最优质量监督力度,促使总承包商质量收益最大;总分包商双方的谈判能力对双方的质量努力程度和报酬分享系数无关,只与固定支付有关。再者,论文进一步分析了 PPP+EPC模式下的总承包商和分包商的质量职责与行为,同时构建了基于双边道德风险条件的质量控制模型。研究发现PPP+EPC模式下分包商的最优质量程度有所提升;同时该模式下国际工程项目的质量要高于单纯的EPC模式。最后利用数值分析验证上述分析的正确性。另外本文分别从内外两个角度,提出了合理增加质量控制条款、总承包商需要加强从EPC总承包向PPP+EPC模式的转变等6个方面的政策与建议。
[Abstract]:Chinese enterprises have been developing rapidly in recent years, gradually adjusting their development strategy and actively participating in international engineering projects with EPC general contracting mode. At the same time, with the growth of enterprise capital strength, the governments of various countries are in financial straitness and PPP EPC model has gradually been favored by the government and enterprises. However, in either mode, the project is completed by the general contractor and many subcontractors, both of whom are responsible for the quality of the project, so the general contractor needs to strengthen its own quality control and the quality control of the subcontractor. So as to ensure the quality of international engineering projects. Based on this, this paper first summarizes and analyzes the domestic and foreign research status of supply chain quality control, and gives the content of this paper, that is, considering the comprehensive ability of subcontractors and the negotiation ability of both parties. Build the game model and analyze the quality behavior of both sides. At the same time, the principal-agent, Nash negotiation and other theories are briefly described to pave the way for further research. Secondly, the thesis combs the quality responsibility and behavior of general contractor and subcontractor under EPC mode. At the same time, based on the principal-agent theory, the quality control model of domestic EPC cooperation project is constructed under the mechanism of the general contractor and subcontractor sharing the punishment of the owner. It is found that the optimal quality effort of the subcontractor increases with the increase of the proportion of the owner's punishment, but there is an optimal proportion of the total contractor to maximize the profit. In addition, based on the principal-agent theory and Nash negotiation theory, the quality control model of subcontractor with no negotiation ability and certain negotiation ability is constructed under the mechanism that the general contractor bears the punishment of the employer. It is found that the stronger the comprehensive ability of the subcontractor is, the higher the optimal quality effort is, and the better the quality supervision of the general contractor is, the greater the quality profit is. The negotiating ability of the general subcontractor has nothing to do with the quality effort and the reward sharing coefficient of both parties, but only with fixed payment. Furthermore, the thesis further analyzes the quality responsibility and behavior of the general contractor and the subcontractor under the PPP EPC model, and constructs a quality control model based on the bilateral moral hazard condition. It is found that the optimal quality degree of subcontractors in PPP EPC mode is improved, and the quality of international engineering projects is higher than that of pure EPC model. Finally, the correctness of the above analysis is verified by numerical analysis. In addition, this paper puts forward six policies and suggestions on how to increase the quality control clauses reasonably from inside and outside, and the general contractor needs to strengthen the transformation from EPC general contract to PPP EPC mode.
【学位授予单位】：西南交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F284

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