不同市场结构和竞争模式下在位创新企业技术许可策略研究

发布时间：2018-05-30 17:16

本文选题：技术创新 + 技术许可　；参考：《华中科技大学》2014年博士论文

【摘要】：技术许可是企业技术创新管理的重要组成部分,是专利制度下技术转移的重要形式,也是专利拥有者通过技术市场获得技术创新收益的一种重要途径。技术许可作为当今除自主创新以外最迅速和有效提高企业技术创新能力的方式,对其进行研究具有重要的理论和现实意义。本文通过对技术许可相关文献的回顾,发现现有研究存在以下不足：第一,大部分文献都假定企业的研发结局是确定的,而事实上研发结局往往是不确定的,研发结局不确定情况下的技术许可策略问题更值得研究；第二,现有文献还没有涉及到对网络外部性和消费者具有不同质量偏好情况下的最优许可策略问题的研究；第三,从供应链上下游的角度对技术许可问题进行研究还未得到足够的重视,这方面的研究也缺乏系统性。本文首先在差异化的Stackelberg框架下研究了研发结局的不确定性对最优许可策略选择的影响。我们建立了一个三阶段(即研发阶段、许可阶段和生产阶段)双寡头博弈模型,分析了产品异质性和技术溢出对随机研发企业最优许可策略的影响。研究表明：(1)固定费许可和产量提成许可的优劣与产品异质性和技术溢出密切相关；(2)当技术溢出程度较低时,两部制许可为最优的许可策略；(3)产量提成许可和两部制许可下,最优的提成率取决于技术溢出的程度,且提成率有可能高于许可后受许可方成本降低的程度。其次,在研发成功后的正常产品市场上,本文在差异化的Stackelberg框架下对Wang (2002)的研究进行了拓展。研究表明：(1)非显著性创新下,产量提成许可总是优于固定费许可,显著性创新下,当产品差异程度较大时产量提成许可优于固定费许可,当产品差异程度较小时固定费许可和产量提成许可均不会发生。这一结论与Wang (2002)有很大的不同；(2)不管产品差异程度和创新规模如何,两部制许可总是优于固定费许可；(3)非显著性创新下,两部制许可总是优于产量提成许可,而显著性创新下,根据产品替代程度的不同,最优的许可策略可能是两部制许可也可能是产量提成许可。此外,本文还从供应链上下游市场的角度,研究了下游市场的技术许可决策。研究表明：(1)上游潜在进入者的进入决策受进入成本、下游在位创新者的许可决策、下游企业间的技术差距和下游市场上产品间的替代程度的影响；(2)下游创新者是否实施许可与其创新规模、下游企业间的技术差距以及上游潜在进入者的进入决策有关。最后,在研发成功后的网络产品市场上,本文在考虑网络外部性和消费者质量偏好差异的情况下,通过建立多阶段Stackelberg博弈模型,对在位创新企业的最优许可策略进行了分析。研究表明：(1)对位创新者来说,无论网络效应强度如何,固定费许可均不是最优的许可策略,随着网络效应强度增加,最优的许可策略由产量提成许可变为两部制许可；(2)对消费者来说,无论网络强度和产品质量差异如何不许可策略总是占优策略；而在许可发生时,固定费许可下消费者剩余最大,产量提成许可下消费者剩余最小。(3)从提高社会福利的角度来说,无论网络效应强度如何,产量提成许可均不是最优的许可策略。此外,本文还从供应链协调的角度研究了供应商的批发价格决策、网络效应强度、市场规模和潜在受许可方的研发投入对在位创新者最优技术许可策略选择的影响。研究结果表明：(1)对于在位创新者而言,不论市场规模、网络效应强度和潜在受许可方的研发成本如何,两部制许可为最优的技术许可策略；(2)产量提成许可和两部制许可可以有效降低因“双重边际效应”给供应链带来的效率损失,从而在一定程度上实现了供应链的协调。
[Abstract]:Technology licensing is an important part of enterprise technological innovation management, an important form of technology transfer under the patent system, and an important way for patent owners to obtain technological innovation benefits through the technology market. Technology license is the most rapid and effective way to improve the technological innovation ability of enterprises, in addition to independent innovation. It is of great theoretical and practical significance to carry out the research. Through the review of relevant literature on technology licensing, this paper finds that the existing research has the following shortcomings: first, most of the literature assumes that the enterprise's R & D outcome is determined, and the fact that the R & D outcome is often uncertain and the technology licensing strategy under the uncertainty of the R & D outcome Second, the existing literature does not involve the study of the optimal licensing strategy for network externalities and consumers with different quality preferences. Third, the research on technical licensing from the angle of upstream and downstream of the supply chain has not been paid enough attention, and the research in this respect is also lack of systematic research. Sex.
This paper first studies the influence of the uncertainty of R & D outcome on the optimal licensing strategy under the differentiated Stackelberg framework. We establish a three stage duopoly game model (R & D stage, licensing stage and production stage), and analyze the optimal licensing strategy of product heterogeneity and technology spillover to stochastic R & D Enterprises. The study shows that: (1) the advantages and disadvantages of fixed fee licensing and production license licensing are closely related to product heterogeneity and technology spillover; (2) when technology spillovers are low, the two part license is the best licensing strategy; (3) the optimal rate of extraction depends on the degree of technology spillover and the rate of yield under the license of production and two parts. It is possible to reduce the cost of the licensee after licensing.
Secondly, in the normal product market after successful development, this paper expands the research of Wang (2002) under the different Stackelberg framework. The study shows that (1) under the non significant innovation, the production license is always superior to the fixed fee license. Under the significant innovation, the production license is superior to the fixed fee when the product difference is large. Permit, when the product difference is small, the fixed fee license and the yield license will not happen. This conclusion is very different from the Wang (2002). (2) no matter the degree of product difference and the scale of innovation, the two part license is always better than the fixed fee license; (3) under the non explicit innovation, the two department license is always better than the yield promotion permit. But under the significant innovation, according to the different degree of replacement of the product, the optimal licensing strategy may be the two part license and the production license. In addition, this paper also studies the technological licensing decision of the downstream market from the angle of the upstream and downstream markets of the supply chain. The study shows that (1) the entry decision of the upstream potential enters is entered into the decision. The licensing decisions of the downstream incumbent innovators, the technological gap between the downstream enterprises and the substitution degree between the downstream markets; (2) the implementation of the downstream innovators is related to their innovation scale, the technological gap between the downstream enterprises and the incoming decision of the upstream potential entrants.
Finally, in the network product market after research and development, this paper analyzes the optimal licensing strategy of an incumbent innovation enterprise by establishing a multi-stage Stackelberg game model under the consideration of the network externality and the difference of consumer quality preference. The study shows that: (1) how the network effect intensity is concerned to the counterpart innovators. Fixed fee license is not the best license policy. With the increase of network effect intensity, the optimal licensing strategy is changed from yield license to two part license. (2) for consumers, no matter how the network intensity and product quality difference are not permitted, the strategy is always dominant; and the fixed fee is allowed to leave the consumer at the time of licensing. The surplus is the biggest. (3) from the point of view of improving the social welfare, no matter how strong the network effect is, the yield licensing is not the best licensing strategy. In addition, this paper also studies the supplier's wholesale price decision, network effect intensity, market scale and potential acceptance from the perspective of supply chain coordination. The effect of Licensor's R & D investment on the choice of optimal technology licensing strategy of incumbent innovators. The results show: (1) for the incumbent, whether the market size, the network effect intensity and the potential licensee's R & D cost, the two system license as the best technical licensing strategy; (2) yield licensing and two licensing It can effectively reduce the loss of efficiency caused by the "double marginal effect" to the supply chain, thus achieving the coordination of supply chain to a certain extent.
【学位授予单位】：华中科技大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F273.1

【参考文献】