不对称信息下线下到线上O2O供应链佣金契约设计

发布时间：2018-06-03 12:52

本文选题：OO供应链 + 线下到线上　；参考：《管理学报》2017年06期

【摘要】：针对由一个线上零售商和一个线下体验店构成的"线下体验+线上购买"O2O供应链,考虑线下体验店体验服务成本信息不对称,建立信息对称与不对称情形下的委托代理模型,研究线上零售商佣金契约设计问题;进而分析佣金契约的性质,考察不对称信息对零售商、体验店及O2O供应链绩效的影响。研究结果表明:基于不同成本类型的体验店,线上零售商设计佣金契约的激励目的不一样;不对称信息的存在会使佣金契约参数发生变化,但不对称信息不一定会降低O2O供应链绩效或产生信息租金。
[Abstract]:In view of the "offline experience online purchase" O2O supply chain, which is composed of an online retailer and an offline experience store, considering the information asymmetry of the offline experience store's experience service cost, a principal-agent model under the condition of information symmetry and asymmetry is established. This paper studies the design of online retailers' commission contracts, analyzes the nature of commission contracts, and examines the effects of asymmetric information on the performance of retailers, experience stores and O2O supply chains. The results show that: based on different cost types of experience stores, the incentive purpose of online retailers to design commission contracts is different, and the existence of asymmetric information will change the parameters of commission contracts. But asymmetric information does not necessarily reduce the performance of O 2 O supply chain or generate information rent.
【作者单位】：重庆大学经济与工商管理学院;重庆大学工商管理与经济发展研究中心;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金资助重大项目(15ZDB169) 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71572020)
【分类号】：F724.2;F724.6

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