基于矩阵形式的Stackelberg主从关系下的冲突分析
发布时间:2018-06-10 07:05
本文选题:渠道冲突 + 冲突分析矩阵形式 ; 参考:《南京航空航天大学》2014年硕士论文
【摘要】:在互联网越来越普及的今天,,电子商务在企业供应链渠道中的地位也显示出其独有的优势。很多企业建立了自己的电子商务渠道,即使某些没有自己网络平台的企业也会与网络零售商合作来拓宽自己的销售渠道,然而由此带来的渠道冲突问题也愈演愈烈。在渠道中,如果制造商的产品在同类产品中具有竞争优势或者制造商掌握了生产技术,此时制造商在供应链中就可能处于主导地位,可以通过自己的行为选择影响供应链中其他成员的行动方案;若零售商拥有大量忠实的顾客或者控制制造商的主要销售途径,则零售商就可能拥有话语权,在供应链中处于主导地位,这种存在主从关系的冲突问题时常发生。虽然传统的博弈论可以解决这种冲突,但需要大量准确的数据支持。在现代社会中,由于外部环境的复杂性和不确定性,再加上社会处于高速发展中,决策者很难获得大量量化的精确信息;同时,也有许多定性冲突问题是传统Stackelberg博弈无法解决的。基于冲突分析的Stackelberg逻辑表达虽然能够解决这种数据匮乏的冲突问题,但是由于它是一种递推形式的表达式,算法很难开发,因此该理论很难应用于实际。本文结合图论与Stackelberg均衡的逻辑表达,就Stackelberg均衡的矩阵表达展开研究,以期将复杂的逻辑表达式转化为矩阵形式,为算法的实现提供理论依据,从而用以解决存在主从关系的供应链渠道冲突问题。 首先,本论文定义严格有序偏好和一般偏好情况下两决策者多步移动(Limited-Move)稳定的矩阵表示,并证明其正确性。在此基础上运用LM稳定性定义Stackelberg均衡的矩阵表示,并证明其与逻辑表达的一致性。两决策者的LM稳定与Stackelberg均衡的矩阵表示不仅丰富了基于矩阵形式的稳定性的定义,而且为Stackelberg问题的解决提供了科学、有效的方法。 其次,将两决策者的矩阵表示拓展到多决策者的情况,在给出LM稳定和Stackelberg均衡的矩阵表示的基础上,利用GUI设计决策支持,解决两决策者和三决策者的Stackelberg问题。这一系统的开发将增加现有冲突分析决策支持系统的功能,扩大现有系统的应用领域。 最后,将冲突分析Stackelberg矩阵模型应用到供应链销售渠道冲突案例中。通过对冲突问题的建模、分析并利用开发的决策支持系统进行稳定性求解,提出了解决该问题的均衡方案。从案例分析可知,当决策者中存在有较强控制力的领导者时,由于他们本身的出发点不同,决策依据不同,所产生的解决方案与Nash均衡是不尽相同的。 本论文提出的矩阵形式的Stackelberg冲突分析方法将拓展基于图模型的冲突分析理论矩阵表示的理论框架;促进Stackelberg均衡算法的实现;开发的决策支持系统为企业从全局高度解决供应链渠道中存在主从关系的冲突提供一种科学的工具。
[Abstract]:With the increasing popularity of the Internet, the status of electronic commerce in enterprise supply chain channels also shows its unique advantages. Many enterprises have established their own e-commerce channels, even some enterprises without their own network platform will cooperate with online retailers to broaden their own sales channels, but the resulting channel conflicts are also intensified. In the channel, if the manufacturer's product has a competitive advantage in the same product or the manufacturer has mastered the production technology, then the manufacturer may be in the dominant position in the supply chain. Action options for other members of the supply chain can be influenced by their own behavior; retailers may have a say if they have a large number of loyal customers or control over the manufacturer's main sales routes. In the supply chain, this kind of conflict between master and slave often occurs. Although traditional game theory can solve this conflict, it needs a lot of accurate data. In modern society, due to the complexity and uncertainty of the external environment, coupled with the rapid development of society, it is difficult for decision makers to obtain a large amount of quantitative and accurate information; at the same time, There are also many qualitative conflicts that cannot be solved by traditional Stackelberg games. Stackelberg logical expression based on conflict analysis can solve the conflict problem of data scarcity, but because it is a recursive expression, the algorithm is difficult to develop, so it is difficult to apply the theory to practice. Based on the logical expression of graph theory and Stackelberg equilibrium, this paper studies the matrix representation of Stackelberg equilibrium, in order to transform the complex logical expression into matrix form and provide the theoretical basis for the realization of the algorithm. In order to solve the problem of supply chain channel conflict with master-slave relationship, this paper defines and proves the stability matrix representation of two decision-makers' multi-step moving limited-Moveve. in the case of strictly ordered preference and general preference. On this basis, the matrix representation of Stackelberg equilibrium is defined by LM stability, and its consistency with logical expression is proved. The matrix representation of LM stability and Stackelberg equilibrium of two decision makers not only enriches the definition of stability based on matrix form, but also provides a scientific and effective method for solving Stackelberg problem. The matrix representation of two decision makers is extended to the case of multiple decision makers. On the basis of the matrix representation of LM stability and Stackelberg equilibrium, the Stackelberg problem of two and three decision makers is solved by using GUI design decision support. The development of this system will increase the function of the existing conflict analysis decision support system and expand the application field of the existing system. Finally, the Stackelberg matrix model of conflict analysis will be applied to the conflict case of supply chain sales channel. By modeling the conflict problem and analyzing and using the developed decision support system (DSS) to solve the stability problem, a balanced scheme is proposed to solve the problem. According to the case study, when there are leaders with strong control among the decision-makers, because of their different starting points, the decision basis is different. The solution is different from Nash equilibrium. The Stackelberg conflict analysis method proposed in this paper will extend the theoretical framework of matrix representation of conflict analysis theory based on graph model and promote the realization of Stackelberg equilibrium algorithm. The developed decision support system (DSS) provides a scientific tool for enterprises to resolve the conflicts between master and slave in supply chain from a global perspective.
【学位授予单位】:南京航空航天大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2014
【分类号】:F274;F713.36
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