信息不对称下的农产品供应链协调研究

发布时间：2018-06-10 16:16

本文选题：农产品供应链协调 + 信息不对称　；参考：《安徽工业大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：供应链管理思想诞生于上世纪九十年代，并得到了飞速的发展。近年来农产品供应链也越来越引起国内外学者的注意，并成为目前国内外学者研究的一个热点。和传统供应链管理一样，农产品供应链管理也要求从系统或全局的观点来全面规划供应链中从初始的农户到最终顾客所涉及的所有环节，并对其中各参与成员、部门之间的物流、信息流和资金流等进行有效的计划、协调、组织和控制，使农产品供应链实现整体优化。即，，将传统的彼此从各自利益出发的独立运作格局转变成一个运用科学管理来实现合作协调的农产品供应链整体，进而提高供应链整体效率，实现供应链成员竞争力的提升。然而人们在供应链管理实践过程中却面临许多难题，如怎样让农产品供应链中分属于不同经济实体的农户和销售企业能树立合作意识以拥有比较对称的信息、具有风险规避特性成员参与的农产品供应链如何协调的问题，并以最终供应链整体利益为目标来分析各自的决策行为。因此，研究信息不对称和有风险规避特性成员参与的农产品供应链协调不仅有重要的理论意义，而且与实际情况相一致的，所以研究这一领域也具有重要的实际意义。本文在综述相关文献的基础上，主要通过转移支付契约模型和期权契约模型来分别解决成本信息不对称和订单农业中有风险规避特者参与情境下的农产品供应链协调问题：（1）研究由一个农户和一个销售企业组成的供应链在成本信息不对称情况下的协调问题。从销售企业的角度分析农户的决策行为，引进生产补助计划来诱导农户调整其生产规模，最终实现协调供应链成员间成本信息不对称的现象的作用。使得在农产品供应链成员收益都实现Pareto改进的情况下也实现了整个供应链效率提高。（2）接下来，研究具有风险规避特性农户参与的农产品供应链协调问题。在订单农业的基础上引入期权契约，建立由一个风险中性的销售企业和一个风险规避的农户组成的农产品供应链模型，并在条件风险估值（CVaR）风险度量准则下，建立具有风险规避特性的农户决策目标函数。分析了不同风险规避度下期权契约对农产品供应链成员的决策行为的影响。研究结果表明对于农户风险规避度η，如需求分布函数值的反函数F1(η)大于无期权协调情况下销售企业的最优农产品订购量Q*r，引入期权契约后农户和销售企业的收益可以实现Pareto改进。
[Abstract]:Supply chain management thought was born in last century 90 s, and got rapid development. In recent years, the supply chain of agricultural products has attracted more and more attention of scholars at home and abroad, and has become a hot spot of scholars at home and abroad. Like traditional supply chain management, supply chain management of agricultural products also requires a systematic or overall view of the supply chain from the initial farmers to the final customer involved in all aspects of the supply chain, and each of the participating members. Effective planning, coordination, organization and control of logistics, information flow and capital flow among departments to optimize the supply chain of agricultural products as a whole. That is to say, the traditional pattern of independent operation from their respective interests is transformed into a cooperative and coordinated agricultural product supply chain with scientific management, thus improving the overall efficiency of the supply chain and enhancing the competitiveness of the members of the supply chain. However, in the practice of supply chain management, people are faced with many difficulties, such as how to make farmers and sales enterprises belonging to different economic entities in the supply chain of agricultural products to establish a sense of cooperation in order to have more symmetrical information. The problem of how to coordinate the supply chain of agricultural products with the participation of the members of risk aversion is discussed, and their decision-making behaviors are analyzed with the overall benefit of the final supply chain as the goal. Therefore, it is not only of theoretical significance to study the coordination of agricultural product supply chain with asymmetric information and the participation of risk-averse characteristic members, but also consistent with the actual situation. Therefore, it is of great practical significance to study this field. Mainly through transfer payment contract model and option contract model to solve the problem of agricultural product supply chain coordination in the context of asymmetric cost information and the participation of risk-averse characters in order-oriented agriculture: (1) the study consists of one farmer and one Coordination problem of supply chain in the case of cost information asymmetry. This paper analyzes the decision behavior of farmers from the point of view of sales enterprises, introduces production subsidy plan to induce farmers to adjust their production scale, and finally realizes the function of coordinating the cost information asymmetry among supply chain members. In the case of Pareto improvement, the efficiency of the whole supply chain is improved. (2) next, the problem of agricultural product supply chain coordination with the participation of farmers with risk aversion is studied. On the basis of order agriculture, an option contract is introduced to establish a supply chain model of agricultural products, which is composed of a risk-neutral sales firm and a risk-averse farmer, and is based on the conditional risk valuation (Cvar) risk measurement criterion. The objective function of peasant household decision with risk aversion is established. This paper analyzes the influence of option contract on the decision-making behavior of agricultural product supply chain members under different risk aversion. The results show that the inverse function F _ 1 (畏) of the value of demand distribution function is larger than the optimal agricultural product ordering quantity of the selling enterprise without option coordination, and the income of farmers and sales enterprises after the introduction of option contract. Pareto can be improved.
【学位授予单位】：安徽工业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F274;F323.7

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