供应商库存博弈对装配系统的绩效影响研究

发布时间：2018-06-10 18:21

本文选题：装配系统 + 信息共享　；参考：《管理科学学报》2013年11期

【摘要】：鉴于供应管理对装配系统的重要意义,本文以VMI管理策略和成本共担机制为背景,研究了信息封闭和信息共享两种环境中多供应商对单制造商的库存博弈问题,以及供应商决策对于零部件库存量和供应链利润分配的影响.此外,通过对比集中模式,给出了提高分散模式绩效的两种途径.研究结果表明:在信息封闭时,供应商对较小库存者的不合理预期会导致决策失误,从而同时损害到制造商和供应商的收益.在保证各参与方期望利润不减和博弈均衡解存在的前提下,信息共享和成本共担比例的调节可以提高分散模式的绩效.如果分散决策能够协同为集中决策,那么在延误成本较高时,集中模式应该采取等量的零部件库存策略,而在延误成本较低时,非等量库存策略会更优,这一结论细分了分散模式向集中模式的改进方向.
[Abstract]:In view of the importance of supply management to assembly system, this paper, based on VMI management strategy and cost sharing mechanism, studies the inventory game between multi-supplier and single manufacturer in two environments: information closure and information sharing. And the impact of supplier decision on spare parts inventory and profit distribution in supply chain. In addition, two ways to improve the performance of decentralized mode are given by comparing the centralized mode. The results show that when the information is closed, the unreasonable expectation of the supplier to the smaller inventory will lead to the wrong decision, which will damage the profit of both the manufacturer and the supplier at the same time. On the premise of ensuring the non-reduction of profit and the existence of game equilibrium solution, the performance of decentralized mode can be improved by adjusting information sharing and cost sharing ratio. If decentralized decision can be coordinated into centralized decision, then when delay cost is high, centralized mode should adopt equal parts inventory strategy, but when delay cost is lower, non-equal inventory strategy will be better. This conclusion subdivides the direction of improvement from dispersion mode to centralized mode.
【作者单位】：华中科技大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71072035)
【分类号】：F274;F224.32

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