两级供应链产品质量控制契约模型分析

发布时间：2018-06-13 03:47

本文选题：供应链 + 质量控制　；参考：《中国管理科学》2013年01期

【摘要】：基于博弈论和委托代理理论,研究在两级供应链中如何进行质量控制契约设计的问题。建立生产商和购买商的期望收益函数模型,生产商对其生产过程投资水平进行决策并确定其产品质量预防水平;购买商进行质量评价决策并确定其产品质量检验水平。生产商存在降低其生产过程投资水平的道德风险问题,在生产过程中将"削减投资",购买商为激励生产商提高其生产过程投资水平将支付"信息租金"的成本。购买商在进行产品质量检验决策时,存在夸大产品质量缺陷率的道德风险问题,在产品质量检验过程中将"过度检验"。运用最优化原理,求解生产商的最优生产过程投资水平、产品质量预防水平和价格折扣额与购买商的最优质量检验水平和外部损失分摊比例,并进行了算例分析,结果表明:当生产商提高其生产过程投资水平时,其质量预防水平将显著增加,购买商的质量检验水平将显著下降;随着购买商质量检验水平的提高,生产商所提供的价格折扣额先增大后减少,生产商所承担的外部损失分摊比例将会下降,其期望收益增加,购买商的期望收益将会减少,供应链联合期望收益将呈现"倒U"型,求解了期望收益的最大值及各契约参数的值,结果证明所提出的质量控制契约模型是可行的。
[Abstract]:Based on game theory and principal-agent theory, the problem of how to design the quality control contract in the two level supply chain is studied. The expected return function model of the producer and buyer is set up. The manufacturer makes decision on the investment level of the production process and determines the quality of the product to prevent the water balance. The buyer makes the quality evaluation decision and determines it. The quality inspection level of the product. The manufacturer has the moral hazard to reduce the investment level of its production process. In the process of production, the manufacturer will "reduce the investment". The buyer will pay the cost of "information rent" in order to encourage the producer to increase the investment level of its production process. The problem of moral hazard in the rate of subsidence will be "overtested" in the process of product quality inspection. The optimal principle is used to solve the investment level of the best production process, the level of product quality prevention and price discount, the optimal quality inspection level and the ratio of external loss allocation to the buyer, and the results are analyzed. The results show that: When the manufacturer raises the investment level of its production process, the level of its quality prevention will increase significantly, and the quality inspection level of the purchaser will decrease significantly. With the improvement of the quality inspection level of the buyer, the price discount provided by the producers will increase first and then decrease, and the proportion of the external loss sharing will be reduced by the producers, and the expected income is expected to be reduced. The expected return of the buyer will be reduced and the combined expected return of the supply chain will be "inverted U". The maximum value of expected income and the value of the contract parameters will be solved. The results show that the quality control contract model is feasible.
【作者单位】：山东师范大学商学院;伊利诺伊大学香槟分校商学院;
【基金】：教育部人文社会科学研究资助项目(12YJC630327,10YJA630194) 山东省自然科学基金资助项目(ZR2012GQ001)
【分类号】：F224;F273.2

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