闭环供应链委托代理激励机制设计研究

发布时间：2018-06-15 02:21

本文选题：闭环供应链 + 委托代理　；参考：《商业研究》2016年06期

【摘要】：当制造商和零售商之间同时存在销售和回收关系时,存在按照销售、回收活动各自单独激励与按照总收益整体激励两种契约类型,本文在信息对称与不对称两种情形下对这两种类型契约的激励机制差异进行研究,结果发现:在信息对称情形下,两种契约类型的均衡结果完全一致;在信息不对称情形下,对零售商而言,无论采取哪一种契约类型,其分成比例均更高,承担的风险也更大,但对制造商而言,按照销售、回收活动各自收益单独激励契约类型更优;从风险规避的角度看,在信息不对称情形下,制造商的确定性等价收益随零售商/制造商风险规避程度的增加而递减,零售商的确定性等价收益保持不变,但努力程度、销售量、回收量随制造商风险规避程度的增加而递增,随零售商风险规避程度的增加而递减,期望收益与制造商的期望收益呈反方向变化,进而导致供应链整体期望收益变化方向不确定。
[Abstract]:When there is a sales and recovery relationship between the manufacturer and the retailer, there are two types of contracts according to the sales, the individual incentive of the recovery activity and the incentive according to the overall total income. In this paper, the difference of incentive mechanism between the two types of contracts is studied in the case of information symmetry and asymmetry. The results show that the equilibrium results of the two types of contracts are identical in the case of information symmetry, and the equilibrium results of the two types of contracts are identical in the case of asymmetric information. For the retailer, no matter which type of contract is adopted, the proportion of each contract is higher and the risk is higher, but for the manufacturer, according to the sales, the individual income of the recovery activity is better than the individual incentive contract type. From the point of view of risk aversion, in the case of information asymmetry, the deterministic equivalent return of manufacturer decreases with the increase of retailer / manufacturer risk aversion, while the deterministic equivalent return of retailer remains unchanged, but the degree of effort is not changed. The volume of sales and recovery increases with the increase of the manufacturer's risk aversion, and decreases with the increase of the retailer's risk aversion. The expected return and the manufacturer's expected income change in the opposite direction. This leads to the uncertainty of the change direction of the overall expected income of the supply chain.
【作者单位】：北京大学光华管理学院;
【分类号】：F274

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